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Abstract
Functional encryption (FE) is a generalization of many commonly employed crypto-
graphic primitives, such as keyword search encryption (KS), identity-based encryption
(IBE), inner-product encryption (IPE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE). In an FE
scheme, the holder of a master secret key can issue tokens associated with functions of
its choice. Possessing a token for f allows one to recover f(m), given an encryption of
m. As it is important that ciphertexts preserve data privacy, in various scenarios it is
also important that tokens do not expose their associated function. A notable example
being the usage of FE to search over encrypted data without revealing the search query.
Function privacy is an emerging new notion that aims to address this problem. The
difficulty of formalizing it lies in the verification functionality, as the holder of a token
for function f may encrypt arbitrary messages using the public key, and obtain a large
number of evaluations of f .
Prior privacy models in the literature were fine-tuned for specific functionalities, did
not model correlations between ciphertexts and decryption tokens, or fell under strong
uninstantiability results. Our first contribution is a new indistinguishability-based privacy
notion that overcomes these limitations and is flexible enough to capture all previously
proposed indistinguishability-based definitions as particular cases.
The second contribution of this thesis is five constructions of private functional encryp-
tion supporting different classes of functions and meeting varying degrees of security: (1)
a white-box construction of an Anonymous IBE scheme based on composite-order groups,
shown to be secure in the absence of correlated messages; (2) a simple and functionality-
agnostic black-box construction from obfuscation, also shown to be secure in the absence
of correlated messages; (3) a more evolved and still functionality-agnostic construction
that achieves a form of function privacy that tolerates limited correlations between mes-
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sages and functions; (4) a KS scheme achieving privacy in the presence of correlated
messages beyond all previously proposed indistinguishability-based security definitions;
(5) a KS construction that achieves our strongest notion of privacy (but relies on a more
expressive form of obfuscation than the previous construction).
The standard approach in FE is to model complex functions as circuits, which yields
inefficient evaluations over large inputs. As our third contribution, we propose a new
primitive that we call “updatable functional encryption” (UFE), where instead of cir-
cuits we deal with RAM programs, which are closer to how programs are expressed in
von Neumann architecture. We impose strict efficiency constrains and we envision tokens
that are capable of updating the ciphertext, over which other tokens can be subsequently
executed. We define a security notion for our primitive and propose a candidate construc-
tion from obfuscation, which serves as a starting point towards the realization of other
schemes and contributes to the study on how to compute RAM programs over public-key
encrypted data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As cloud services become increasingly popular, security concerns arise from exposing the
user’s data to third-party service providers. Encryption can be used to protect the user’s
data, but traditional public-key encryption is intrinsically designed to provide all-or-
nothing security guarantees, meaning that either one possesses the decryption key and
can decrypt the entire plaintext or nothing can be learned about the plaintext (besides,
perhaps, its length). In this sense, usability is sacrificed if the owner of the data is
unable to specify a decryption policy or delegate search operations to the storage service
provider.
Over time, several cryptographic primitives emerged, with different use-case scenarios
in mind, where one can learn a function of the plaintext. The first of such primitives was
identity-based encryption (IBE), proposed by Shamir [Sha84] in 1984, but instantiations
only appeared later in 2001 with the seminal papers of Boneh and Franklin [BF01] and
Cocks [Coc01]. In an IBE scheme, an authority holding the master secret key can extract
decryption keys associated with identities, which are bit-strings that uniquely identify an
entity or a person, such as a passport number or an e-mail address. A ciphertext encrypted
under the master public-key and (let’s say) Alice’s identity (e.g. “alice.liddell@uni.lu”)
can only be decrypted with Alice’s decryption key, which only the holder of the master
secret key can issue.
Other primitives provide search delegation functionalities. The simplest of wich is
public-key encryption with keyword search (KS), introduced in [BDOP04]. It allows
exact-matching searches to be carried out over ciphertexts. A typical scenario where this
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primitive can bring great benefits to users (and consequently to service providers wishing
to increase their customer base as well) is that of any email system. Suppose user Alice
stores her emails in the servers of some email service provider, so that she can access
them from either her laptop or her smartphone. Alice does not trust the service provider
or fears that government agencies may require the service provider to hand over all her
data. Using standard public key encryption, any user with Alice’s public key can send
her encrypted emails that only she can decrypt. For Alice to find a particular email later
on, the sender could also attach to the email some searchable ciphertexts, produced from
a KS scheme, with keywords that Alice might use when searching for this email. These
ciphertexts are searchable upon delegation, meaning that only Alice can authorize the
email service provider to search on her behalf by issuing a token that encodes Alice’s
search criteria (e.g. ciphertexts that encrypt the keyword “project RAPID20130115”),
generated from her own secret key. The service provider searches through all Alice’s emails
for those containing searchable ciphertexts that match the issued token, and returns to
her only those with a positive match.
For more expressive search queries, the works of Boneh and Waters [BW07] and
Katz, Sahai and Waters [KSW13] show how to compute conjunctive queries (P1∧ ...∧Pl),
disjunctive queries (P1∨...∨Pl), subset queries (x ∈ S) and range queries (x ∈ [a, b]) from
inner-product encryption (IPE) [AAB+15], where evaluating a token for vector a on a
ciphertext that encrypts vector b gives 1 if and only if 〈a,b〉 = 0. Some variants of IPE are
defined such that the evaluation returns a payload message m [KSW13, LOS+10, AFV11],
or the actual result of computing the inner product 〈a,b〉 [ABDP15, ABDP16]. The most
recent developments IPE give rise to efficient schemes from standard assumptions.
More generally, the concept of functional encryption (FE) was independently formal-
ized by Boneh, Sahai and Waters [BSW11] and O’Neil [O’N10]. In an FE scheme, the
holder of the master secret key can issue tokens associated with functions of its choice.
Possessing a token for function f allows one to recover f(m), given an encryption of m.
Informally, security dictates that only f(m) is revealed about m and nothing else. One
can easily see that IBE, KS and IPE fall in as particular cases of functional encryption
with restricted functionality support. The most common approach is to model functions
as circuits, and in an important fundamental result, Garg et al. [GGH+13] put forth
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the first construction of an FE scheme supporting all polynomial-size circuits based on
indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) for circuits, which is now known as a central hub for
the realization of many cryptographic primitives [SW14].
Standard notions of security for functional encryption [BSW11, O’N10] do not cover
important use cases where, not only encrypted data, but also the functions associated with
decryption tokens contain sensitive information. They guarantee that nothing about the
plaintexts beyond query results are revealed to the server. However, they do not guarantee
that the performed query, which may also contain sensitive information, remains hidden,
which is of particular relevance in the context of searchable encryption. Function privacy
is an emerging new notion that aims to address this problem. The difficulty of formalizing
it lies in the evaluation functionality of FE, as the holder of a token for f may encrypt
arbitrary messages using the public key, and obtain a large number of evaluations of f
via the decryption algorithm. This means that function privacy can only be achieved
as long as the token holder is unable to learn f through such an attack. How to define
function privacy and how construct FE schemes that offer such security guarantees are
the main questions addressed in this thesis.
1.1 Related work
The formal study of function privacy begins in the work of Boneh, Raghunathan and
Segev [BRS13a], where the authors focused on identity-based encryption (IBE) and pre-
sented the first constructions offering various degrees of privacy. From the onset, it
became clear that formalizing such a notion is challenging, even for simple functionalities
such as IBE, as a large number of evaluation can always be computed for each token via
the decryption algorithm. Boneh et al. therefore considered privacy for identities with
high min-entropy. In general, however, the previous observation implies that function
privacy can only be achieved as long as the token holder is unable to learn the function
associated with the token through function evaluation, immediately suggesting a strong
connection between private functional encryption and obfuscation.
Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev [BRS13a, BRS13b] give indistinguishability-based
definitions of function privacy for IBE and subspace membership (a generalization of
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inner-product encryption). Roughly speaking, the IBE model imposes that whenever the
token queries of the adversary have high min-entropy (or form a block source), decryption
tokens will be indistinguishable from those corresponding to identities sampled from
the uniform distribution. For subspace membership, the definition requires the random
variables associated with vector components to be a block source.
Tokens for high-entropy identities, however, rarely exist in isolation and are often
available in conjunction with ciphertexts encrypted for the very same identities. To ad-
dress this requirement, the same authors [BRS13a] proposed an enhanced model for IBE
in which the adversary also gets access to ciphertexts encrypted for identities associated
with the challenge tokens. We show this model to be infeasible under the formalism
of Boneh et al., as correlations with encrypted identities can lead to distinguishing at-
tacks, e.g. via repetition patterns. (We will discuss this later in the thesis.) Although
the model can be salvaged by further restricting the class of admissible distributions,
it becomes primitive-specific and formulating a definition for other functionalities is not
obvious (and indeed a similar extension was not formalized for subspace membership
in [BRS13b]). Additionally, this model also falls short of capturing arbitrary correla-
tions between encrypted messages and tokens, as it does not allow an adversary to see
ciphertexts for identities which, although correlated with those extracted in the challenge
tokens, do not match any of them.
Recently, Agrawal et al. [AAB+15] put forth a model for functional encryption that
aims to address this problem with a very general UC-style definition (called “wishful se-
curity”). The core of the definition is an ideal security notion for functional encryption,
which makes it explicit that both data privacy and function privacy should be simulta-
neously enforced. However, not only is this general simulation-based definition difficult
to work with, but also aiming for it would amount to constructing virtual black-box ob-
fuscation, for which strong impossibility results are known [BGI+01, GK05]. Indeed, the
positive results of [AAB+15] are obtained in idealized models of computation.
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1.2 Our contributions
The above discussion highlights the need for a general and convenient definition of pri-
vacy that incorporates arbitrary correlations between decryption tokens and encrypted
messages, and yet can be shown to be feasible without relying on idealized models of
computation. The first contribution of our work is an indistinguishability-based defi-
nition that precisely models arbitrary correlations for general circuits. Our definition
builds on a framework for unpredictable samplers and unifies within a single definition all
previous indistinguishability-based notions.
The second contribution of this thesis is five constructions of private functional en-
cryption schemes supporting different classes of functions and meeting varying degrees of
security: (1) a white-box construction of an Anonymous IBE scheme based on composite-
order groups, shown to be secure in the absence of correlated messages; (2) a simple and
functionality-agnostic black-box construction from obfuscation, also shown to be secure
in the absence of correlated messages; (3) a more evolved and still functionality-agnostic
construction that achieves a form of function privacy that tolerates limited correlations
between messages and functions; (4) a KS scheme achieving privacy in the presence of
correlated messages beyond all previously proposed indistinguishability-based security
definitions; (5) a KS construction that achieves our strongest notion of privacy (but relies
on a more expressive form of obfuscation than the previous construction). We also develop
an obfuscator for hyperplane membership that, when plugged into the third construction
above gives rise to a private inner-product encryption scheme, answering a question left
open by Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev [BRS13b] on how to define and realize enhanced
security (i.e., privacy in the presence of correlated messages) for schemes supporting this
functionality.
The standard approach in FE is to model complex functions as circuits, which yields
inefficient evaluations over large inputs. As our third contribution, we propose a new
primitive that we call “updatable functional encryption” (UFE), where instead of cir-
cuits we deal with RAM programs, which are closer to how programs are expressed in
von Neumann architecture. We impose strict efficiency constrains and we envision tokens
that are capable of updating the ciphertext, over which other tokens can be subsequently
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executed. We define a security notion for our primitive and propose a candidate construc-
tion from obfuscation, which serves as a starting point towards the realization of other
schemes and contributes to the study on how to compute RAM programs over public-key
encrypted data.
The unpredictability framework. At the core of our definitional work lies a pre-
cise definition characterizing which distributions over circuits and what correlated side
information can be tolerated by a private FE scheme. We build on ideas from obfusca-
tion [BST14, BC14, BBC+14], functional encryption [BSW11, O’N10] and prior work in
function privacy [BRS13a, BRS13b, ATR14, AAB+15] to define a game-based notion of
unpredictability for general functions. Our definition allows a sampler S to output a pair
of circuit vectors (C0,C1) and a pair of message vectors (m0,m1) with arbitrary correla-
tions between them, along with some side information z. Unpredictability then imposes
that no predictor P interacting with oracles computing evaluations on these circuits and
messages can find a point x such that C0(x) 6= C1(x). (We do not impose indistinguisha-
bility, which is stronger, results in a smaller class of unpredictable samplers, and hence
leads to weaker security.) The predictor P sees z and the outputs of the sampled circuits
on the sampled messages. It can run in bounded or unbounded time, but it can only
make polynomially many oracle queries to obtain additional information about the sam-
pled circuits and messages. To avoid attacks that arise in the presence of computationally
unpredictable auxiliary information [BM14, BST16] we adopt unbounded prediction later
in the security analysis of our private functional encryption schemes.
This formalism fixes the unpredictability notion throughout the thesis. We can then
capture specific types of samplers by imposing extra structural requirements on them. For
instance, we may require the sampler to output a bounded number of circuits and mes-
sages, or include specific data in the auxiliary information, or not include any auxiliary
information at all. Imposing that the sampler outputs single-circuit vectors, no messages,
and includes the circuits as auxiliary information leads to the notion of differing-inputs
obfuscation [ABG+13, BST14]. Further imposing that the sampler also includes in the
auxiliary information its random coins or allowing the predictor to run in unbounded time
leads to public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation [IPS15] and indistinguishability obfusca-
tion [GR14, BM14, GGH+13], respectively. A sampler outputting circuits and messages
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comes to hand to model the privacy for functional encryption. We emphasize that our
definition intentionally does not require the messages to be unpredictable. Further dis-
cussion on this choice can be found in Chapter 3.
The PRIV model. Building on unpredictability, we put forth a new indistinguishability-
based notion of function privacy. Our notion, which we call PRIV, bears close resemblance
to the standard IND-CPA model for functional encryption: it comes with a left-or-right
LR oracle, a token-extraction TGen oracle and the goal of the adversary is to guess
a bit. The power of the model lies in that we endow LR with the ability to generate
arbitrary messages and circuits via an unpredictable sampler. Trivial attacks are excluded
by the joint action of unpredictability and the usual FE legitimacy condition, imposing
equality of images on left and right. The enhanced model of Boneh, Raghunathan and
Segev [BRS13a] falls in as a special case where the sampler is structurally restricted to be a
block source. But our definition goes well beyond this and considers arbitrary and possibly
low-entropy correlations. Furthermore, since unpredictability is not imposed on messages,
PRIV implies IND-CPA security, and consequently it also guarantees anonymity for
primitives such as IBE and ABE [BSW11]. Correlated circuits may be “low entropy”
as long as they are identical on left and right, and since previous definitions adopted a
real-or-random definition, they had to exclude this possibility. By giving the sampler the
option to omit, manipulate and repeat the messages, our security notion implies previous
indistinguishability-based notions in the literature, including those in [BRS13a, BRS13b,
ATR14, AAB+15].
The implications of our new definition become clearer when we focus on (public-key
encryption with) keyword search (KS) [BDOP04]. Consider a scenario where a client
searches for a keyword but obtains no matching ciphertexts. The client then slightly
modifies the keyword and requests a new search, now resulting in one or more successful
matches. In this setting, the server sees ciphertexts encrypting unknown keywords that
are closely related to keywords which the server holds tokens for. Our model ensures that
if searched keywords are unpredictable from the perspective of the server, this uncertainty
is preserved by the KS scheme after the searches are carried out. This does not imply
that the server will be unable to distinguish a sequence of successful queries over the same
high-entropy keyword, from a sequence of successful queries over different high-entropy
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keywords (this is impossible to achieve [ATR14]). However, when keyword searches do not
match any of the correlated ciphertexts, then search patterns are guaranteed to remain
hidden, even in the presence of low-entropy correlated encrypted keywords. We note
that this captures a strong notion of unlinkability and untraceability between unmatched
queries.
Constructions. We start by looking at Boyen and Waters [BW06] anonymous identity-
based encryption scheme in the hope of showing that it already achieves some form of
function privacy, as the decryption keys are randomized. Towards this end, we first
present a simplified version of the original scheme and show that, in the random oracle
model, not only IND-CPA security is still guaranteed, we are also able to lift the selective-
id constraint in the proof. Next, we show that the scheme is PRIV secure up to two
decryption keys, in the absence of correlated messages. In fact, we also show that if the
sampler outputs vectors with just three identities, there is a trivial attack. To improve
security, we extend the scheme to groups of composite order and show that the extended
version is secure for an unbounded number of keys.
Taking a more general approach, we then formalize the intuition that obfuscating cir-
cuits before extraction should provide some level of privacy in FE. Using unpredictable
samplers, we first generalize distributionally-indistinguishable (DI) obfuscators [BC14]
from point functions to general circuits. Our obfuscate-then-extract OX transform shows
that PRIV security in the absence of correlated messages can be achieved using DI obfus-
cators. In the reverse direction, we also established that some weak form of DI obfusca-
tion (for samplers outputting single-circuit vectors) is also necessary. We also show that
composable VGB obfuscation implies full-fledged DI obfuscation. So, emerging positive
results on composable VGB obfuscation [BCKP14, BC14] already lead to PRIV-secure
functional encryption schemes (supporting the same class of circuits as the obfuscator)
in the absence of correlated messages.
To move beyond the above token-only model, we need to “decouple” the correlations
between encrypted messages and challenge circuits so we can take advantage of FE secu-
rity (that protects ciphertexts) and obfuscation (that protects the circuits) in a cumulative
way. Building on ideas from [ABSV15] and [BCKP14] we identify a class of concentrated
samplers that can be used in conjunction with the so-called “trojan” method—a tech-
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nique to boost selective security to adaptive security in FE—to achieve function privacy.
This construction improves on the security guarantees of OX considerably, but comes
with the caveat that a mild restriction on second-stage token queries must be imposed:
they must reveal (via circuit outputs) no more information about encrypted correlated
messages than those revealed by first-stage queries. We give non-trivial examples of con-
centrated samplers and derive constructions for classes of circuits that encompass, among
other functionalities, IBE, KS and inner-product encryption. By giving a construction of
a DI obfuscator for hyperplane membership, we resolve a question left open by Boneh,
Raghunathan and Segev [BRS13b] on the extension and realization of enhanced security
for inner-product encryption.
Our forth construction is specific to point functions, and besides being simpler and
more efficient, can tolerate arbitrary correlations between challenge keywords and en-
crypted messages. Put differently this construction removes the concentration restriction
on samplers. For this construction we require a functional encryption scheme that sup-
ports the OR composition of two DI-secure point obfuscations. The composable VGB
point obfuscator of Bitansky and Canetti [BC14] implies that the required DI point obfus-
cator exists. Furthermore, we also rely on a standard functional encryption scheme that
supports the evaluations of four group operations in a DDH group (corresponding to the
disjunction of two point function obfuscations), which is a relatively modest computation.
We are, however, unable to lift the mild second-stage restriction.
Our last construction lifts the second-stage restriction at the cost of relying on more
expressive forms of obfuscators. The novelty in this construction resides in the observation
that, in order to offer the keyword search functionality, it suffices to encrypt information
that enables equality checks between words and messages to be carried out. In our fourth
construction we encode a message m as an obfuscation of the point function C[m]. Con-
cretely, we obfuscate words before extraction and messages before encryption. Equality
with w can be checked using a circuit D[w] that on input an obfuscated point function
Obf(C[m]) returns Obf(C[m])(w). We emphasize that D[w] is not a point function. We
also need to ensure that an attacker cannot exploit the D[w] circuits by, say, encrypting
obfuscations of malicious circuits of its choice. We do this using NIZK proofs to ensure the
outputs of the point obfuscator are verifiable: one can publicly verify that an obfuscation
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indeed corresponds to some point function. To summarize, our construction relies on a DI
obfuscator supporting point functions C[m](w) := (m = w) and circuits D[w](C) := C(w)
and a general-purpose FE. The circuits C[m] and D[w] were used negatively by Barak et
al. [BGI+01] to launch generic attacks against VBB. Here, the restrictions imposed on
legitimate PRIV samplers ensure that these attacks cannot be carried out in our setting,
and obfuscators supporting them can be used positively to build private FE schemes.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries, Notation and
Standard Definitions
2.1 Notation
We denote the security parameter by λ ∈ N and assume it is implicitly given to all
algorithms in unary representation 1λ. We denote the set of all bit strings of length ` by
{0, 1}` and the length of a string x by |x|. The bit complement of a string x is denoted
by x. We use the symbol ε to denote the empty string. A vector of strings x is written in
boldface, and x[i] denotes its ith entry. The number of entries of x is denoted by |x|. For
a finite set X, we denote its cardinality by |X| and the action of sampling a uniformly
random element x from X by x ←$ X. For a random variable X we denote its support
by [X]. For a circuit C we denote its size by |C|. We call a real-valued function µ(λ)
negligible if µ(λ) ∈ O(λ−ω(1)) and denote the set of all negligible functions by Negl.
Throughput this thesis, ⊥ denotes a special failure symbol outside the spaces underlying
a cryptographic primitive. We adopt the code-based game-playing framework [BR06].
As usual “ppt” stands for probabilistic polynomial time.
Circuit families. Let MSp := {MSpλ}λ∈N and OSp := {OSpλ}λ∈N be two families
of finite sets parametrized by a security parameter λ ∈ N. A circuit family CSp :=
{CSpλ}λ∈N is a sequence of circuit sets indexed by the security parameter. We assume
that for all λ ∈ N, all circuits in CSpλ share a common input domain MSpλ and output
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space OSpλ. We also assume that membership in sets can be efficiently decided. For a
vector of circuits C = [C1, . . . ,Cn] and a vector of messages m = [m1, . . . ,mm] we define
C(m) to be an n × m matrix whose ijth entry is Ci(mj). When OSpλ = {0, 1} for all
values of λ we call the circuit family Boolean.
Trees. We associate a tree T with the set of its nodes {nodei,j}. Each node is indexed
by a pair of non-negative integers representing the position (level and branch) of the node
on the tree. The root of the tree is indexed by (0, 0), its children have indices (1, 0), (1, 1),
etc. A binary tree is perfectly balanced if every leaf is at the same level.
2.2 Bilinear groups and complexity assumptions
We first review the basic properties of prime-order bilinear groups and the computa-
tional assumptions Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) [BF01] and Decision Lin-
ear (DLIN) [BBS04]. We then review the properties of composite-order bilinear groups
and the Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumption made in [BW07]. Looking
ahead, these properties are relevant for our white-box construction of a function-private
AIBE scheme, described in Section 6.1.
2.2.1 Bilinear groups of prime order
A prime-order bilinear group generator is an algorithm GP that takes as input a security
parameter 1λ and outputs a description Γ = (p,G,GT, e, g) where:
• G and GT are groups of order p with efficiently-computable group laws, where p is
a λ-bit prime.
• g is a generator of G.
• e is an efficiently-computable bilinear pairing e : G x G→ GT, i.e. a map satisfying
the following properties:
– Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Zp, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab;
– Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
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Definition 1. We say the DBDH assumption holds for group generator GP if for every
ppt adversary A we have that
AdvdbdhGP ,A(λ) := 2 · Pr[DBDHAGP (1λ)]− 1 ∈ Negl,
where game DBDH is described in Figure 2.1 on the left.
Definition 2. We say the DLIN assumption holds for group generator GP if for every
ppt adversary A we have that
AdvdlinGP ,A(λ) := 2 · Pr[DLINAGP (1λ)]− 1 ∈ Negl,
where game DLIN is described in Figure 2.1 on the right.
DBDHAGP (1
λ):
Γ ←$ GP(1λ)
(p,G,GT, e, g)← Γ
z1, z2, z3 ←$ Zp
b ←$ {0, 1}
if (b = 0) then Z← e(g, g)z1z2z3
else Z ←$ GT
b′ ←$ A(Γ, gz1 , gz2 , gz3 ,Z)
return (b = b′)
DLINAGP (1
λ):
Γ ←$ GP(1λ)
(p,G,GT, e, g)← Γ
z1, z2, z3, z4 ←$ Zp
b ←$ {0, 1}
if (b = 0) then Z← gz3+z4
else Z ←$ GT
b′ ←$ A(Γ, gz1 , gz2 , gz1z3 , gz2z4 ,Z)
return (b = b′)
Figure 2.1: Games defining DBDH and DLIN computational assumptions.
2.2.2 Bilinear groups of composite order
A composite-order bilinear group generator is an algorithm GC that takes as input a
security parameter 1λ and outputs a description Γ = (p, q,G,GT, e, g) where:
• G and GT are groups of order n = pq, where p and q are independent λ-bit primes,
with efficiently computable group laws.
• g is a generator of G.
• e is an efficiently-computable bilinear pairing e : G x G→ GT, i.e. a map satisfying
the following properties:
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– Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Zn, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab;
– Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
Subgroups Gp ⊂ G and Gq ⊂ G of order p and order q can be generated respectively by
gp = g
q and gq = g
p. We recall some important properties regarding these groups:
• G = Gp x Gq
• e(gp, gq) = e(gq, gp) = e(g, g)n = 1
• e(gp, (gp)a · (gq)b) = e(gp, (gp)a) · e(gp, (gq)b) = e(gp, gp)a
Definition 3. We say the C3DH assumption holds for group generator GC if for every
ppt adversary A we have that
Advc3dhGC ,A(λ) := 2 · Pr[C3DHAGC(1λ)]− 1 ∈ Negl,
where game C3DH is described in Figure 2.2.
C3DHAGC (1
λ):
(p, q,G,GT, e, g) ←$ GC(1λ)
n← pq; gp ← gq; gq ← gp
Γ′ ← (n,G,GT, e, g, gp, gq)
X1,X2,X3 ←$ Gq
a, b, c ←$ Zn
b ←$ {0, 1}
if (b = 0) then R← X3(gp)c
else R ←$ G
b′ ←$ A(Γ′, (gp)a, (gp)b,X1(gp)ab,X2(gp)abc,R)
return (b = b′)
Figure 2.2: Game defining C3DH computational assumption.
2.3 Cryptographic primitives
We now review standard definitions of several cryptographic primitives, namely pseu-
dorandom permutations, public-key encryption, functional encryption (and its particu-
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lar forms anonymous identity-based encryption, keyword search encryption and inner-
product encryption), non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems, collision-resistant
hash functions and puncturable pseudorandom functions. The definitions of functional
encryption will serve as a starting point towards the security modelling of what we call pri-
vate functional encryption. The remaining cryptographic primitives will serve as building
blocks in our constructions.
2.3.1 Pseudorandom permutations
Let KSp := {KSpλ}λ∈N and MSp := {MSpλ}λ∈N be two families of finite sets parametrized
by a security parameter λ ∈ N. A pseudorandom permutation (PRP) family PRP :=
(K,E,D) is a triple of ppt algorithms as follows. (1) K on input the security parameter
outputs a uniform element in KSpλ; (2) E is deterministic and on input a key k ∈ KSpλ
and a point x ∈ MSpλ outputs a point in MSpλ; (3) D is deterministic and on input
a k ∈ KSpλ and a point x ∈ MSpλ outputs a point in MSpλ. The PRP family PRP is
correct if for all λ ∈ N, all k ∈ KSpλ and all x ∈ MSpλ we have that D(k,E(k, x)) = x.
A pseudorandom permutation PRP := (K,E,D) is called PRP secure if for every ppt
adversary A we have that
AdvprpPRP,A(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
PRPAPRP(1
λ)
]− 1 ∈ Negl
where game PRPAPRP(1
λ) is defined in Figure 2.3. For our purposes, we rely on the non-
strong security notion where inverse queries are not allowed. Furthermore, we do not
necessarily require the inverse map D to be efficiently computable.
PRPAPRP(1
λ):
b ←$ {0, 1}
k ←$ K(1λ)
b′ ←$ AFn(1λ)
return (b = b′)
Fn(x):
if T [x] = ⊥ then
T [x] ←$ MSpλ \ T
if b = 1 return T [x]
else return E(k, x)
Figure 2.3: Game defining the security of a pseudorandom permutation PRP.
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2.3.2 Public-key encryption
A public-key encryption scheme PKE := (PKE.Setup,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) with message
space MSp := {MSpλ}λ∈N and randomness space RSp := {RSpλ}λ∈N is specified by three
ppt algorithms as follows. (1) PKE.Setup(1λ) is the probabilistic key-generation algo-
rithm, taking as input the security parameter and returning a secret key sk and a public
key pk. (2) PKE.Enc(pk,m; r) is the probabilistic encryption algorithm. On input a public
key pk, a message m ∈ MSpλ and possibly some random coins r ∈ RSpλ, this algorithm
outputs a ciphertext c. (3) PKE.Dec(sk, c) is the deterministic decryption algorithm. On
input of a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, this algorithm outputs a message m ∈ MSpλ
or failure symbol ⊥.
Correctness. The correctness of a public-key encryption scheme requires that for any
λ ∈ N, any (sk, pk) ∈ [PKE.Setup(1λ)], any m ∈ MSpλ and any random coins r ∈ RSpλ,
we have that PKE.Dec(sk,PKE.Enc(pk,m; r)) = m.
Security. We recall the standard security notions of indistinguishability under chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) and its weaker variant known as indistinguishability under
chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). We say that a public-key encryption scheme PKE
is IND-CCA secure if for every legitimate ppt adversary A
Advind-ccaPKE,A (λ) := 2 · Pr[IND-CCAAPKE(1λ)]− 1 ,
where game IND-CCAAPKE described in Figure 2.4, in which the adversary has access
to a left-or-right challenge oracle (LR) and a decryption oracle (Dec). We say that A
is legitimate if: (1) |m0| = |m1| whenever the left-or-right oracle is queried; and (2)
the adversary does not call the decryption oracle with c ∈ list. We obtain the weaker
IND-CPA notion if the adversary is not allowed to place any decryption query.
IND-CCAAPKE(1
λ):
(sk, pk) ←$ PKE.Setup(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,Dec(1λ, pk)
return (b = b′)
LR(m0,m1):
c ←$ PKE.Enc(pk,mb)
list← c : list
return c
Dec(c):
m← PKE.Dec(sk, c)
return m
Figure 2.4: Game defining IND-CCA security of a public-key encryption scheme PKE.
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2.3.3 Functional encryption
Syntax. A functional encryption scheme FE associated with a circuit family CSp is
specified by four ppt algorithms as follows. (1) FE.Gen(1λ) is the setup algorithm and
on input a security parameter 1λ it outputs a master secret key msk and a master public
key mpk; (2) FE.TGen(msk,C) is the token-generation algorithm and on input a master
secret key msk and a circuit C ∈ CSpλ outputs a token tk for C; (3) FE.Enc(mpk,m) is the
encryption algorithm and on input a master public key mpk and a message m ∈ MSpλ
outputs a ciphertext c; (4) FE.Eval(c, tk) is the deterministic evaluation (or decryption)
algorithm and on input a ciphertext c and a token tk outputs a value y ∈ OSpλ or failure
symbol ⊥.
We adopt a computational notion of correctness for FE schemes and require that no
ppt adversary is able to produce a message m and a circuit C that violates the standard
correctness property of the FE scheme (that is, FE.Eval(FE.Enc(mpk,m),FE.TGen(msk,C))
6= C(m)), even with the help of an (unrestricted) token-generation oracle. We also adopt
the standard notion of IND-CPA security [BSW11, O’N10] where an adversary with ac-
cess to a token-generation oracle cannot distinguish encryptions of messages m0, m1 under
the standard restriction that it cannot obtain a decryption token for a circuit C for which
C(m0) 6= C(m1).
Correctness. We will adopt a game-based definition of computational correctness for
FE schemes which has been widely adopted in the literature [ABC+08, Gol04] and suffices
for the overwhelming majority of use cases. Roughly speaking, this property requires that
no efficient adversary is able to come up with a message and a circuit which violates the
correctness property of the FE scheme, even with the help of an (unrestricted) token-
generation oracle. Formally, we say that scheme FE is computationally correct if for all
ppt adversaries A
AdvccFE,A(λ) := Pr
[
CCAFE(1
λ)
] ∈ Negl ,
where game CCAFE(1
λ) is shown in Figure 2.5 on the left. Perfect correctness corresponds
to the setting where the above advantage is required to be zero.
Security. A functional encryption scheme FE is IND-CPA secure [BSW11, O’N10] if
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for any legitimate ppt adversary A
Advind-cpaFE,A (λ) := 2 · Pr
[
IND-CPAAFE(1
λ)
]− 1 ∈ Negl ,
where game IND-CPAAFE(1
λ) is defined in Figure 2.5 on the right. We say A is legitimate
if for all messages pairs queried to the left-or-right oracle, i.e., for all (m0,m1) ∈ MList,
and all extracted circuits C ∈ TList we have that C(m0) = C(m1).
CCAFE(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
(m,C) ←$ ATGen(mpk)
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk,m)
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk,C)
y ←$ FE.Eval(c, tk)
return (y 6= C(m))
TGen(C):
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk,C)
return tk
IND-CPAAFE(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
return (b = b′)
LR(m0,m1):
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk,mb)
MList← (m0,m1) : MList
return c
TGen(C):
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk,C)
TList← C : TList
return tk
Figure 2.5: Games defining the computational correctness and IND-CPA security of a
functional encryption scheme FE.
The IND-CPA notion self-composes in the sense that security against adversaries that
place one LR query is equivalent to the setting where an arbitrary number of queries is
allowed. It is also well known that IND-CPA security is weaker than generalizations
of semantic security for functional encryption [BSW11, O’N10, BF13], and strong im-
possibility results for the latter have been established [BSW11, GVW12, AGVW13].
On the other hand, IND-CPA-secure FE schemes for all polynomial-size circuit families
have been recently constructed [GVW12, GGH+13, GKP+13]. Other recent feasibility
results have been established in weaker forms of the IND-CPA model such as the selec-
tive model [GVW12, GGH+13, GKP+13] where the adversary commits to its challenge
messages at the onset; or the weak model for Boolean circuits, where the adversary is
restricted to extract tokens that evaluate to 0 on the challenge messages [GVW15].
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2.3.3.1 Anonymous identity-based encryption
Identity-based encryption (IBE) was first proposed by Shamir [Sha84], but instantia-
tions only appeared later with the seminal papers of Boneh and Franklin [BF01] and
Cocks [Coc01]. In an IBE scheme, an authority holding the master secret key can extract
decryption keys associated with identities, such as passport numbers or an e-mail ad-
dresses. A ciphertext encrypted under the master public-key and some identity can only
be decrypted with a decryption key for that identity, which only the authority holding
the master secret key can issue. Here, we describe the syntax, correctness and security of
anonymous identity-based encryption schemes (AIBE). Briefly, anonymity requires that
the ciphertext also hides the identity for which it is intended.
Syntax. An anonymous identity based encryption scheme AIBE is a functional encryp-
tion scheme for a circuit family CSpλ := {C[id?] : id? ∈ IdSpλ}, over identity space IdSpλ
and message space MSpλ, such that each circuit C is defined as:
C[id?](id,m) :=
m if (id = id
?);
⊥ otherwise.
For simplicity, C is canonically represented by the identity id? with which it is associated.
We write the algorithms of an AIBE scheme as follows. (1) AIBE.Setup(1λ) is the setup
algorithm and on input a security parameter 1λ it outputs a master secret key msk and
a master public key mpk; (2) AIBE.Enc(mpk, id,m) is the encryption algorithm and on
input a master public key mpk, an identity id ∈ IdSpλ and a message m ∈ MSpλ, it
outputs a ciphertext c; (3) AIBE.KeyGen(msk, id) is the key-generation algorithm and on
input a master secret key msk and an identity id ∈ IdSpλ it outputs a decryption key
skid; (4) finally, AIBE.Dec(skid, c) is the decryption algorithm that on input a secret key
skid and a ciphertext c, it either outputs a message m ∈ MSpλ or a failure symbol ⊥.
The correctness and IND-CPA security of AIBE are defined identically to that of FE
schemes supporting the circuit class described above. Note that this results in semantic
security and anonymity in the traditional sense applied to identity-based encryption, i.e.
ciphertexts conceal both the message and the identity of the recipient.
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2.3.3.2 Keyword search encryption
Set circuits. In this work we are interested in Boolean circuits that assume the value
1 on only a polynomially large subset of their domains. We call these set circuits. We
define the canonical representation of a set circuit C with its corresponding set S as the
circuit C[S] that has the set S explicitly hardwired in it:
C[S](m) :=
1 if m ∈ S;0 otherwise.
Formally, a family of Boolean circuits CSp is a set circuit family if there is a polynomial
poly such that for all λ ∈ N and all C ∈ CSpλ we have that |S(C)| ≤ poly(λ) where
S(C) := {m ∈ MSpλ : C(m) = 1}. Point circuits/functions correspond to the case
where poly(λ) = 1. We use C[m] to denote the point circuit that on input m returns 1
and 0 otherwise. Throughout the thesis, we assume that non-obfuscated set circuits are
canonically represented.
Syntax. A public-key encryption with keyword search scheme (or simply a keyword
search scheme) KS is a functional encryption scheme for a point circuit family over the
message space: CSpλ := {C[m] : m ∈ MSpλ}. We often identify circuit C[m] with its
message m, but in order to distinguish circuits from messages we use the term keyword to
refer to the former. We write the algorithms associated to a KS scheme as KS.Gen(1λ),
KS.Enc(pk,m), KS.TGen(sk,w) and KS.Test(c, tk), where the latter outputs either 0 or 1.
The computational correctness of a KS scheme is defined identically to that of an FE
scheme. We say the scheme has no false negatives if correctness advantage is negligible
and, whenever A outputs (w,C[w]), it is 0. IND-CPA security is also defined identically to
FE schemes for point function families. Note that weak and standard IND-CPA notions
are equivalent for KS schemes.
2.3.3.3 Inner-product encryption
Syntax. Let CSp := {CSpdp} be a set circuit family of hyperplane membership testing
functions that is defined for each value of the security parameter λ such that p is a λ-bit
prime and d is a positive integer. Every circuit C ∈ CSpdp is canonically represented by a
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vector ~a ∈ Zdp (i.e. ~a is a vector of d elements from Zp) and returns 1 if and only if the
input vector ~x ∈ Zdp is orthogonal to ~a. More precisely,
C[~a](~x) :=
1 if 〈~x,~a〉 = 0;0 otherwise.
An inner-product encryption scheme IPE is a functional encryption scheme for a hy-
perplane membership testing circuit family CSpλ := {C[~a] : ~a ∈ Zdp}. The correctness
and IND-CPA security of inner-product encryption are defined identically to that of FE
schemes supporting the circuit class CSp as defined above.
2.3.4 NIZK proof systems
Syntax. A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for an NP language L with
an efficiently computable binary relation R consists of three ppt algorithms as follows.
(1) NIZK.Setup(1λ) is the setup algorithm and on input a security parameter 1λ it outputs
a common reference string crs; (2) NIZK.Prove(crs, x, ω) is the proving algorithm and on
input a common reference string crs, a statement x and a witness ω it outputs a proof pi
or a failure symbol ⊥; (3) NIZK.Verify(crs, x, pi) is the verification algorithm and on input
a common reference string crs, a statement x and a proof pi it outputs either true or false.
Perfect completeness. Completeness imposes that an honest prover can always
convince an honest verifier that a statement belongs to L, provided that it holds a witness
testifying to this fact. We say a NIZK proof is perfectly complete if for every (possibly
unbounded) adversary A
AdvcompleteNIZK,A (λ) := Pr
[
CompleteANIZK(1
λ)
]
= 0 ,
where game CompleteANIZK(1
λ) is shown in Figure 2.6 on the left.
Statistical soundness. Soundness imposes that a malicious prover cannot convince
an honest verifier of a false statement. We say a NIZK proof is perfectly sound if for every
(possibly unbounded) adversary A we have that
AdvsoundNIZK,A(λ) := Pr
[
SoundANIZK(1
λ)
] ∈ Negl ,
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where game SoundANIZK(1
λ) is shown in Figure 2.6 on the right. If the above advantage is
0, we say the NIZK proof system is perfectly sound.
Computational zero knowledge. The zero-knowledge property guarantees that
proofs do not leak information about the witnesses that originated them. Technically,
this is formalized by requiring the existence of a ppt simulator Sim = (Sim1, Sim2) where
Sim1 takes the security parameter 1
λ as input and outputs a simulated common reference
string crs together with a trapdoor tp, and Sim2 takes the trapdoor as input tp together
with a statement x ∈ L for which it must forge a proof pi. We say a proof system is
computationally zero knowledge if, for every ppt adversary A, there exists a simulator
Sim such that
AdvzkNIZK,A,Sim(λ) :=
∣∣∣Pr [ZK-RealANIZK(1λ)]− [ZK-IdealA,SimNIZK (1λ)]∣∣∣ ∈ Negl ,
where games ZK-RealANIZK(1
λ) and ZK-IdealA,SimNIZK (1
λ) are shown in Figure 2.7.
CompleteANIZK(1
λ):
crs ←$ NIZK.Setup(1λ)
(x, ω) ←$ A(1λ, crs)
if (x, ω) /∈ R return 0
pi ←$ NIZK.Prove(crs, x, ω)
return ¬(NIZK.Verify(crs, x, pi))
SoundANIZK(1
λ):
crs ←$ NIZK.Setup(1λ)
(x, pi) ←$ A(1λ, crs)
return (x /∈ L ∧
NIZK.Verify(crs, x, pi))
Figure 2.6: Games defining the completeness and soundness properties of a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof system NIZK.
ZK-RealANIZK(1
λ):
crs ←$ NIZK.Setup(1λ)
b ←$ AProve(1λ, crs)
Prove(x, ω):
if (x, ω) /∈ R return ⊥
pi ←$ NIZK.Prove(crs, x, ω)
return pi
ZK-IdealA,SimNIZK (1
λ):
(crs, tp) ←$ Sim1(1λ)
b ←$ AProve(1λ, crs)
Prove(x, ω):
if (x, ω) /∈ R return ⊥
pi ←$ Sim2(crs, tp, x)
return pi
Figure 2.7: Games defining the zero-knowledge property of a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof system NIZK.
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2.3.5 Collision-resistant hash functions
A hash function family H := {Hλ}λ∈N is a set parametrized by a security parameter
λ ∈ N, where each Hλ is a collection of functions mapping {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n such that
m > n. The hash function family H is said to be collision-resistant if no ppt adversary
A can find a pair of colliding inputs, with noticeable probability, given a function picked
uniformly from Hλ. More precisely, we require that
AdvcrH,A(λ) := Pr[CR
A
H(1
λ)] ∈ Negl,
where game CRAH(1
λ) is defined in Figure 2.8.
CRAH (1
λ):
h ←$ Hλ
(x0, x1) ←$ A(1λ, h)
return (x0 6= x1 ∧ h(x0) = h(x1))
Figure 2.8: Game defining collision-resistance of a hash function family H.
2.3.6 Puncturable pseudorandom functions
We define a puncturable pseudorandom function family PPRF := (PPRF.Gen,PPRF.Eval,
PPRF.Punc) as the following triple of ppt algorithms. (1) PPRF.Gen on input the security
parameter 1λ outputs a uniform element in KSpλ; (2) PPRF.Eval is deterministic and on
input a key k ∈ KSpλ and a point x ∈ Xλ outputs a point y ∈ Yλ; (3) PPRF.Punc is
probabilistic and on input a k ∈ KSpλ and a polynomial-size set of points S ⊆ Xλ outputs
a punctured key kS. As per [SW14], we require the PPRF to satisfy the following two
properties:
Functionality preservation under puncturing : It holds that for every λ ∈ N,
every polynomial-size set S ⊆ Xλ and every x ∈ Xλ \ S,
Pr
 PPRF.Eval(k, x) = PPRF.Eval(kS, x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ k ←$ PPRF.Gen(1
λ)
kS ←$ PPRF.Punc(k, S)
 = 1.
Pseudorandomness at punctured points : For every ppt adversary A,
AdvpprfPPRF,A(λ) := 2 · Pr[PPRFAPPRF(1λ)]− 1 ∈ Negl,
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where game PPRFAPPRF(1
λ) is defined in Figure 2.9.
PPRFAPPRF(1
λ):
(S, st) ←$ A0(1λ)
k ←$ PPRF.Gen(1λ)
kS ←$ PPRF.Punc(k,S)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ AFn1 (1λ, kS, st)
return (b = b′)
Fn(x):
if x /∈ S return PPRF.Eval(kS, x)
if T [x] = ⊥ then
T [x] ←$ Yλ
if b = 1 return T [x]
else return PPRF.Eval(k, x)
Figure 2.9: Game defining the pseudorandomness at punctured points property of a
puncturable pseudorandom function PPRF.
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Chapter 3
Unpredictable Samplers
The results described in this section have been published in [ABF16].
The privacy notions that we will be developing in the coming sections rely on multistage
adversaries that must adhere to certain high-entropy requirements on the sampled cir-
cuits. Rather than speaking about specific distributions for specific circuit classes, we
introduce a uniform treatment for any circuit class via an unpredictability game. Our
framework allows one to introduce restricted classes of samplers by imposing structural
restrictions on their internal operation without changes to the reference unpredictability
game. Our framework extends that of Bellare, Stepanov and Tessaro [BST14] for obfus-
cators and also models the challenge-generation phase in private functional encryption in
prior works [BRS13a, BRS13b, ATR14, AAB+15].
3.1 Definitions
Syntax. A sampler for a circuit family CSp is an algorithm S that on input the security
parameter 1λ and possibly some state information st outputs a pair of vectors of CSpλ
circuits (C0,C1) of equal dimension, a pair of vectors of MSpλ messages (m0,m1) of
equal dimension, and some auxiliary information z. We require the components of the
two circuit (resp., message) vectors to be encoded as bit strings of equal length. Input
st may encode information about the environment where the sampler is run (e.g., the
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public parameters of a higher-level protocol) and z models side information available on
the sampled circuits or messages.
In the security games we will be considering later on, the goal of adversary will be to
distinguish which of two circuit distributions produced by an unpredictable sampler was
used to form some cryptographic data (e.g., an obfuscated circuit or an FE token). Our
unpredictability definition formalizes the intuition that by examining the input/output
behavior of the sampled circuits on messages of choice, the evaluation of legitimate cir-
cuits of choice on sampled messages, and the evaluation of sampled circuits on sampled
messages, a point leading to differing outputs on some pair of sampled circuits cannot be
found. Drawing a parallel to the functional encryption setting, once decryption tokens or
encrypted messages become available, the tokens can be used by a legitimate adversary
to compute the circuits underneath on arbitrary values, including some special messages
that are possibly correlated with the circuits.
Unpredictability. A legitimate sampler S is statistically (multi-instance) unpre-
dictable if for any unbounded legitimate predictor P that places polynomially many
queries
Adv
(m)pred
S,P (λ) := Pr
[
(m)PredPS (1
λ)
] ∈ Negl ,
where games mPredPS (1
λ) and PredPS (1
λ) are shown in Figure 3.1. Sampler S is called
legitimate if C0(m
′
0) = C1(m
′
1) for all queries made to the Sp oracle in game mPred
P
S (1
λ),
or simply required that C0(m0) = C1(m1) in game Pred
P
S (1
λ). Predictor P is legitimate
if C(m0) = C(m1) for all queries made to the Func oracle (in both multi-instance and
single-instance games).1
The mPred game is multi-instance and the predictor can place polynomially many
queries to Sam and set st arbitrarily. The latter essentially ensures that S generates fresh
entropy on any input st. We emphasize that the winning condition demands component-
wise inequality of circuit outputs. In particular the predictor is not considered successful
if it outputs a message which leads to different outputs across different Sam queries or
within the same Sam query but on different circuit indices.
1We do not impose that C0(m) = C1(m) within the Func oracle as this is exactly the event that P is
aiming to invoke to win the game. The restriction we do impose allows for a sampler to be unpredictable
while possibility outputting low-entropy messages that might even differ on left and right.
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mPredPS (1
λ):
(i,m) ←$ PSam,Func,Sp(1λ)
(C0,C1,m0,m1)← list[i]
return (C0(m) 6= C1(m))
Sam(st):
(C0,C1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
list← list : (C0,C1,m0,m1)
return z
Func(i,m,C):
(C0,C1,m0,m1)← list[i]
return (C0(m),C(m0))
Sp(i, j):
(C0,C1,m0,m1)← list[i]
(C′0,C
′
1,m
′
0,m
′
1)← list[j]
return C0(m
′
0)
PredPS (1
λ):
(st, st′) ←$ P1(1λ)
(C0,C1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
m ←$ PFunc2 (1λ,C0(m0), z, st′)
return (C0(m) 6= C1(m))
Func(m,C):
return (C0(m),C(m0))
Figure 3.1: Games defining multi-instance and single-instance unpredictability of a sam-
pler S.
A number of technical choices have been made in devising these definitions. By
the legitimacy of the sampler C0(m0) = C1(m1) and hence only one of these values
is provided to the predictor. Furthermore, since the goal of the predictor is to find a
differing input, modifying the experiment so that Func returns C1(m) (or both values)
would result in an equivalent definition. Our definition intentionally does not consider
unpredictability of messages. Instead, one could ask the predictor to output either a
message that results in differing evaluations on challenge circuits or a circuit that evaluates
differently on challenge messages. This would, however, lead to an excessively restrictive
unpredictability notion and excludes many circuit samplers of practical relevance.
Composition. A standard guessing argument shows that any stateless sampler (one
that keeps no internal state and uses independent random coins on each invocation, but
might still receive st explicitly passed as input) is multi-instance unpredictable (where
P can place q queries to Sam) if and only if it is single-instance unpredictable (where
P can only place a single Sam query). The reduction in one direction is trivial. In the
other direction we guess the index i∗ that the multi-instance predictor P will output and
simulate Sam queries 1, . . . , (i∗ − 1) and (i∗ + 1), . . . , q by running the sampler S in the
reduction—this is where we need the stateless property—and answer the i∗th one using
the Sam oracle in the single-instance game. Queries to Func with index i∗ are answered
analogously using the single-instance counterpart whereas those with index different from
i∗ will use the explicit knowledge of the circuits and messages generated by the reduction.
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Queries Sp with index (i, j) are answered as follows. If both i and j are different from
i∗, use the explicit knowledge of circuits and messages. If i = i∗ but j 6= i∗, use the
explicit knowledge of the messages and the single-instance Func oracle on i∗. If i 6= i∗
but j = i∗, use the knowledge of the circuit and single-instance Func. For (i∗, i∗) queries,
use the Sp oracle in the single-instance game. Note that the legitimacy of the constructed
single-instance predictor follows from the legitimacy of the multi-instance predictor and
the sampler.
Proposition 1 (Unpredictability composition). A stateless sampler is multi-instance
unpredictable (Figure 3.1 on the left) if and only if it is single-instance unpredictable
(Figure 3.1 on the right).
The samplers that we study in this work are stateless and therefore we use the def-
inition in Figure 3.1 on the right for simplicity. Nevertheless, our framework can be
used to analyze stateful samplers as well. We leave the study of such samplers as an
important (and practically relevant) direction for future work. In the following section,
we define a number of special classes of samplers by imposing structural restrictions on
their internal operation. This serves to illustrate how various samplers that previously
appeared in the literature can be modeled within our framework. In particular, defini-
tions of high-entropy and block source samplers for keywords [BRS13a], block sources for
inner products [BRS13b], and circuit sampler distributions used in various obfuscation
definitions can be seen as particular cases within this framework.
3.2 Taxonomy of samplers
We define a number of special classes of samplers by imposing structural restrictions on
their internal operation.
Stateless. The sampler does not keep any internal state and uses independent set of
coins on each invocation. All samplers will be stateless in this work unless stated
otherwise.
(t, s)-bounded. For polynomials t and s, with overwhelming probability |C0| = |C1| ≤
t(λ) and |m0| = |m1| ≤ s(λ).
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Circuits-only. The sampler outputs no messages with overwhelming probability, i.e. it
is (·, 0)-bounded.
One-sided. C0 = C1 and m0 = m1 with overwhelming probability. In this case we will
simply write (C,m, z) ←$ S(1λ, st) for the sampling operation. Note that every
one-sided sampler is trivially unpredictable.
Input-independent. For any 1λ and st, S(1λ, st) = S(1λ, ε) with overwhelming proba-
bility.
Aux-free. With overwhelming probability z = ε.
Simple. If the sampler is both aux-free and input-independent.
Random-aux. For a polynomial poly and a ppt algorithm S ′ the sampler takes the form
S(1λ, st) : z ←$ {0, 1}poly(λ);
(C0,C1,m0,m1) ←$ S ′(1λ, z, st);
return (C0,C1,m0,m1, z) .
Differing-inputs. With overwhelming probability z contains the sampler’s output cir-
cuits (C0,C1). Note that statistical unpredictability would imply that the sampled
circuits are functionally equivalent, whereas computational unpredictability would
lead to a notion of differing-inputs samplers used to formulate differing-inputs ob-
fuscation [ABG+13, BST14].
Block-source. A t-block-source is a random variable X = (X1, . . . , Xt) where for every
j ∈ [t] and x1, . . . , xj−1 it holds that Xj|X1=x1,...,Xj−1=xj−1 has high min-entropy.
There is therefore sufficient decorrelation between different components in such a
distribution. We can model block sources in our framework by restricting attention
to ppt samplers that take the form
S(1λ, st) : (C0,C1) ←$ S ′(1λ, st);
j ←$ [t];
return ((C0[j],C1[j]), (C0[1..(j − 1)],C1[1..(j − 1)]))
where S ′ is a (t, 0)-bounded sampler. The rationale here is that any indistinguisha-
bility-based security definition that imposes an adversary to output two block
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sources, and later on distinguish some computation performed on the sampled val-
ues, e.g. [BRS13a], would remain the same if a sampler such as the one above
was used instead (note that in this case, the adversary can only have an advan-
tage when outputting distributions that component-wise differ with non-negligible
probability).
Functionally-differing. S is a (t, ·)-bounded sampler and, with overwhelming proba-
bility over its random coins, ∀j ∈ [t], ∃x s.t. C0[j](x) 6= C1[j](x).
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Chapter 4
Obfuscators
The results described in this section have been published in [ABF16].
An obfuscator is an efficient compiler that takes as input a circuit description and out-
puts the description of another circuit with the same functionality that is of similar
size, but yet is unintelligible. In recent years, program obfuscation as found tremendous
applications in cryptography, ranging from functional encryption [GGH+13] to deniable
encryption [SW14] to multi-party computation [GGHR14]. Several of the constructions
we propose later in this thesis rely on obfuscation, so we take the time go over def-
initions and revisit concrete obfuscators for the classes of functions comprising point
functions and hyperplane membership testing functions. We generalize distributionally-
indistinguishable (DI) obfuscators [BC14] from point functions to general circuits, show
that DI is a weakening of composable virtual grey-box (CVGB) [BC14, BCKP14], and
construct a DI obfuscator for hyperplane membership testing functions.
Syntax. An obfuscator for a circuit family CSp is a uniform ppt algorithm Obf that on
input the security parameter 1λ and the description of a circuit C ∈ CSpλ outputs the
description of another circuit C. We require any obfuscator to satisfy the following two
requirements.
Functionality preservation : For any λ ∈ N, any C ∈ CSpλ and any m ∈ MSpλ,
with overwhelming probability over the choice of C ←$ Obf(1λ,C) we have that
C(m) = C(m).
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Polynomial slowdown : There is a polynomial poly such that for any λ ∈ N, any
C ∈ CSpλ and any C ←$ Obf(1λ,C) we have that |C| ≤ poly(|C|).
Security definitions for obfuscators can be divided into indistinguishability-based and
simulation-based notions. Perhaps the most natural notion is the virtual black-box (VBB)
property [BGI+01], which requires that whatever can be computed from an obfuscated
circuit can be also simulated using oracle access to the circuit. Here, we consider a
weakening of this notion, known as virtual grey-box (VGB) security [BC14, BCKP14]
that follows the VBB approach, but allows simulators to run in unbounded time, as long
as they make polynomially many queries to their oracles; we call such simulators semi-
bounded. Below we present a self-composable strengthening of this notion where the
VGB property is required to hold in the presence of multiple obfuscated circuits.
In the context of security definitions for obfuscators, we consider samplers that do not
output any messages. Furthermore, we call a sampler one-sided if its sampled circuits
are identical on left and right with probability 1.
4.1 Indistinguishability obfuscation
This property requires that given any two functionally equivalent circuits C0 and C1 of
equal size, the obfuscations of C0 and C1 should be computationally indistinguishable.
More precisely, for any ppt adversary A and for any sampler S that outputs two circuits
C0,C1 ∈ CSpλ such that C0(m) = C1(m) for all inputs m and |C0| = |C1|, we have that
AdvioObf,S,A(λ) := 2 · Pr[iOS,AObf (1λ)]− 1 ∈ Negl,
where game iOS,AObf (λ) is defined in Figure 4.1.
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iOS,AObf (1
λ):
(C0,C1, z) ←$ S(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
C ←$ Obf(1λ,Cb)
b′ ←$ A1(1λ,C0,C1, z,C)
return (b = b′)
Figure 4.1: Game defining iO security of an obfuscator Obf.
4.2 Composable VGB obfuscation
An obfuscator Obf is composable VGB (CVGB) secure if for every ppt adversary A there
exists a semi-bounded simulator Sim such that for every ppt one-sided circuit sampler S
the advantage
AdvcvgbObf,S,A,Sim(λ) :=
∣∣∣Pr [CVGB-RealS,AObf (1λ)]− Pr [CVGB-IdealS,SimObf (1λ)]∣∣∣ ∈ Negl,
where games CVGB-RealS,AObf (λ) and CVGB-Ideal
S,Sim
Obf (λ) are shown in Figure 4.2.
CVGB-RealS,AObf (1
λ):
(C, z) ←$ S(1λ, ε)
C ←$ Obf(1λ,C)
b ←$ A(1λ,C, z)
return b
CVGB-IdealS,SimObf (1
λ):
(C, z) ←$ S(1λ, ε)
b ←$ SimFunc(1λ, 1|C|, z)
return b
Func(m):
return C(m)
Figure 4.2: Games defining the CVGB security of an obfuscator Obf.
By considering samplers that only output a single circuit we recover the standard
(worst-case) VGB property. The VBB property corresponds to the case where the sim-
ulator is required to run in polynomial time. Average-case notions of obfuscation cor-
respond to definitions where the circuit samplers are fixed. A result of Bitansky and
Canetti [BC14, Proposition A.3] on the equivalence of VGB with and without auxiliary
information can be easily shown to also hold in the presence of multiple circuits, from
which one can conclude that CVGB with auxiliary information is the same as CVGB
without auxiliary information.
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We also introduce the following adaptation of an indistinguishability-based notion of
obfuscation introduced in [BC14] for point functions.
4.3 Distributional indistinguishability obfuscation
An obfuscator Obf is DI secure if, for every unpredictable ppt sampler S and every ppt
adversary A,
AdvdiObf,S,A(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
DIS,AObf (1
λ)
]
− 1 ∈ Negl ,
where game DIS,AObf (1
λ) is defined in Figure 4.3 on the left.
DIS,AObf (1
λ):
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ASam(1λ)
return (b = b′)
Sam(st):
(C0,C1, z) ←$ S(1λ, st)
C ←$ Obf(1λ,Cb)
return (C, z)
OWAObf(1
λ):
1t ←$ A1(1λ)
w ←$ MSpλ
C← [C[w], . . . ,C[w]] // t copies
C ←$ Obf(1λ,C)
w′ ←$ A2(1λ,C)
return (w = w′)
Figure 4.3: Games defining the DI and OW security of an obfuscator Obf. (One-way
security is defined for point-functions only.)
The above definition strengthens the one in [BC14] and gives the sampler the possi-
bility to leak auxiliary information to the adversary. In particular, we can consider the
case where images of an (internally generated) vector of messages that are correlated with
the circuits are provided to A. (Our constructions will rely on this property for point
obfuscators.) Throughout the thesis we consider DI adversaries that place a single query
to the Sam oracle. It can easily be shown that the DI self-composes for stateless sam-
plers, meaning that security against adversaries that place one Sam query is equivalent
to the setting where an arbitrary number of queries are allowed. Note also that we allow
the adversary to pass some state information st to the sampler. Security with respect
to all ppt and statistically unpredictable samplers can be shown to be equivalent to a
variant definition where the adversary is run after the sampler and the state st is set to
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the empty string ε.
We recover the definition of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [GGH+13] when
samplers are required to output a single circuit on left and right and include these two
circuits explicitly in z. Differing-inputs obfuscation (diO) [ABG+13] is obtained if the
predictor is also limited to run in polynomial time.
It has been shown that, for point functions, the notions of CVGB and DI (without
auxiliary information) are equivalent [BC14, Theorem 5.1]. Following a similar argument
to the first part of the proof in [BC14, Theorem 5.1], we show that CVGB for any
circuit family implies distributional indistinguishability even with auxiliary information
for the same circuit family. Hence, our notion of DI obfuscation is potentially weaker
than CVGB. This proof crucially relies on the restriction that samplers are required to
be unpredictable in the presence of unbounded predictors. The proof of the converse
direction in [BC14, Theorem 5.1] uses techniques specific to point functions and we leave
a generalization to wider classes of circuits for future work.
Proposition 2 (CVGB =⇒ DI). Any CVGB obfuscator for a class of circuits CSp is
also DI secure with respect to all statistically unpredictable samplers for the same class
CSp.
Proof. Let (S,A) be a DI adversary against the obfuscator. We show that the advantage
of A must be negligible if S is unpredictable and the obfuscator is CVGB secure. Also,
let RSpλ denote the randomness space of A. Consider a one-sided circuit sampler S ′
that selects r ←$ RSpλ, runs A(1λ; r) until it outputs st, runs S(1λ, st), chooses a bit b
uniformly at random, and outputs the left or right outputs of S according to the bit b,
along with auxiliary information z and coins r. Let B be a CVGB-Real adversary that
runs A on the same coins and answers Sam oracle query with its challenge vector of
obuscations. B outputs whatever A outputs. By the CVGB property, for (S ′,B) there is
a (possibly unbounded) simulator Sim such that:
AdvcvgbObf,S′,B,Sim(λ) =
∣∣∣Pr [CVGB-RealS′,BObf (1λ)]− Pr [CVGB-IdealS′,SimObf (1λ)]∣∣∣ .
Note that
AdvdiObf,S,A(λ) = Pr
[
CVGB-RealS
′,B
Obf (1
λ)|b = 1
]
− Pr
[
CVGB-RealS
′,B
Obf (1
λ)|b = 0
]
.
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Hence,
AdvdiObf,S,A(λ) ≤
∣∣∣Pr [CVGB-IdealS′,SimObf (1λ)|b = 1]− Pr [CVGB-IdealS′,SimObf (1λ)|b = 0]∣∣∣+
+ 2 ·AdvcvgbObf,S′,B,Sim(λ) .
Let Q(λ) denote the number of queries of Sim. We claim that there is a predictor P
making at most Q(λ) queries such that∣∣∣Pr [CVGB-IdealS′,SimObf (1λ)|b = 1]− Pr [CVGB-IdealS′,SimObf (1λ)|b = 0]∣∣∣ ≤ Q(λ)·AdvpredS,P (λ) .
From this it follows that
AdvdiObf,S,A(λ) ≤ Q(λ) ·AdvpredS,P (λ) + 2 ·AdvcvgbObf,S′,B,Sim(λ) .
We prove the claim via unpredictability of the sampler. Observe that the views of Sim in
the CVGB-Ideal game for b = 0 and b = 1 are identical unless Sim queries its oracle on a
point that results in different outputs for the left and right circuits. This event, however,
immediately leads to a break of unpredictability. Consider a (possibly unbounded) pre-
dictor P = (P1,P2) as follows. P1 selects random coins r←$ RSpλ and runs A(1λ; r) until
it outputs st. P1 then outputs (st, r). P2(1λ, , z, r) chooses a random index i ←$ [Q(λ)]
indicating a guess for the first query of Sim that leads to a break of unpredictability. It
runs Sim(z||r) and answers its oracle queries using its own provided oracle (which always
respond for left circuits b = 0). At query i algorithm P2 stops and outputs the queried
value. With probability 1/Q(λ) this is the first query that the bad event occurs. Hence
P2 runs Sim perfectly until query i, at which point it wins the unpredictability game.
This concludes the proof as the above holds for any poly (which in turn implies that
the left hand side is negligible).
We conclude this discussion by introducing a new notion of one-way point obfuscation
that requires it to be infeasible to recover the point given many obfuscations of it.
One-way point obfuscation. Let Obf be an obfuscator for a point circuit family
CSp. We say Obf is OW secure if for every ppt adversary A
AdvowObf,A(λ) := Pr
[
OWAObf(1
λ)
] ∈ Negl ,
where game OWAObf(1
λ) is shown in Figure 4.3 on the right. The next proposition shows
that OW is a weakening of DI for point circuits.
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Proposition 3 (DI =⇒ OW for point circuits). Let Obf be an obfuscator for a point
circuit family CSp. If Obf is DI secure with respect to all ppt samplers, then it is also
OW secure.
Proof. We show that OW is a weakening of DI for point circuits. Given an OW adversary
A we construct a sampler S and a distinguisher D attacking DI security as follows. First,
we partition each set CSpλ into two sets (of super-polynomial size) CSp
0
λ and CSp
1
λ, such
that |CSp0λ| = |CSp1λ| + negl(λ). This partition can be based on some lexicographic
criterion (e.g., the most significant bit of the point), as long as one can efficiently decide
membership in each partition. Our sampler S samples two point circuits C0 and C1,
uniformly at random from CSp0λ and CSp
1
λ, respectively. It then outputs two t-sized
vectors C0 = (C0, . . . ,C0) and C1 = (C1, . . . ,C1). (Here t is the length parameter initially
output by the one-wayness adversary A.) (Recall that auxiliary information z is empty.)
It is clear that S is unpredictable, and therefore legitimate as a DI sampler. On obtaining
the obfuscations, the distinguisher D runs adversary A on the same inputs and recover a
circuit C′. Observe that the distribution of the obfuscations provided to A is statistically
close to the correct distribution given the combined action of S and the challenge bit
in the DI game. Distinguisher D then returns 0 if C′ ∈ CSp0λ and 1 otherwise. It
is straightforward to establish that a non-negligible advantage for A in the OW game
translates to a non-negligible advantage for (S,D) in the DI game.
4.3.1 Canetti’s point obfuscator
In this section, we recall the point function obfuscator constructed in [Can97] and proven
to be DI-secure under the Strong Vector DDH (SVDDH) assumption in [BC14]. Not only
this point function obfuscator can be used later to instantiate our OX, TOX and DOX
constructions (see Chapter 6), we use a similar approach to prove that the hyperplane
membership obfuscator by [CRV10] is also DI-secure under a generalization of the SVDDH
assumption. (We refer to the next section for more details on these results.)
Let G be a group of prime order p for which the SVDDH assumption [BC14] holds,
and let CSp := {C[x] : m ∈ Zp} be a point circuit family for points in the domain Zp. To
obfuscate the point circuit C[x], first sample a generator r uniformly at random from G,
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compute R ← gx, then construct the circuit C[r, R], which has r and R hardwired into
it, such that:
C[r, R](z) :=
1 if r
z = R;
0 otherwise.
Under the SVDDH assumption [BC14, Assumption 6.1], this obfuscator can be shown
to be DI secure [BC14, Theorem 6.1].
4.3.2 An hyperplane membership obfuscator
Let CSp := {CSpdp} be a set circuit family of hyperplane membership testing functions
that is defined for each value of the security parameter λ such that there is a λ-bit prime
p and a positive integer d. Every circuit C ∈ CSpdp is canonically represented by a vector
~a ∈ Zdp and returns 1 if and only if the input vector ~x ∈ Zdp is orthogonal to ~a, i.e.,
C[~a](~x) :=
1 if 〈~x,~a〉 = 0;0 otherwise.
We build on the results of [BC14, CRV10] to construct a DI-secure obfuscator for this
family of circuits under a generalization of the Strong Vector DDH (SVDDH) assumption
used in [BC14]. In order to avoid attacks similar to the one described in [BST16] that
puts a one element instance of SVDDH with arbitrary auxiliary information (or AI-
DHI assumption, as referred to by [BST16]) in contention with the existence of VGB
obfuscators supporting specific classes of circuits, we assume that our generalized SVDDH
assumption holds only in the presence of random auxiliary information. This immediately
translates to an obfuscator that tolerates the same type of leakage, which is enough to
serve as a candidate to instantiate our functionality-agnostic constructions and obtain
private inner-product encryption schemes, from which it is known how to derive expressive
predicates that include equality tests, conjunctions, disjunctions and evaluation of CNF
and DNF formulas (among others) [BW07, KSW13].
Canetti, Rothblum and Varia [CRV10] presented a virtual black-box obfuscator for
the hyperplane membership functionality, which works as follows. Let G be a group
of prime order p for which the SVDDH assumption [CRV10] holds. To obfuscate the
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hyperplane membership circuit represented by a vector ~a, sample a generator g uniformly
at random from G, compute gi ← g~a[i] for 1 ≤ i ≤ d, and construct the circuit that, given
a vector ~x, returns 1 if and only if
∏d
i=1 g
~x[i]
i is equal to G’s identity element. (Note
that
∏d
i=1 g
~x[i]
i = g
〈~a,~x〉, so this is the case if 〈~a, ~x〉 = 0.) We assume that the resulting
obfuscated circuit is canonically represented by (g1, . . . , gd), generated as described above.
We will now prove that this same construction satisfies distributional indistinguishability
under a generalization of the SVDDH assumption, a DDH-style assumption we present
in Figure 4.5.
Unpredictable hyperplane membership samplers. We begin by refining the no-
tion of unpredictable samplers to the case of hyperplane membership circuits. In general,
a sampler for the hyperplane membership functionality will output two lists of message
vectors corresponding to candidate hyperplane members, and two lists of hyperplane
vectors, plus some auxiliary information z, which in this thesis we will assume to be a
random string of polynomial size poly(λ). However, since we are dealing with obfuscation,
we will consider samplers where no messages are produced. We recall the unpredictability
experiment for this special case in Figure 4.4, where notation 〈w,m〉 denotes the vector
that results from computing 〈w[i],m〉 ?= 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |w|. (Note that here w is a
list of vectors in Zdp and m is a vector in Zdp.) Sampler outputs only random auxiliary
information.
PredPS (1
λ):
(st, st′) ←$ P1(1λ)
z ←$ {0, 1}poly(λ)
(w0,w1) ←$ S(1λ, z, st)
m ←$ PFunc2 (1λ, z, st′)
return (〈w0,m〉 6= 〈w1,m〉)
Func(m):
return 〈w0,m〉
Figure 4.4: Game defining single-instance unpredictability of a hyperplane membership
sampler S.
Computational Assumption. Our computational assumption is a vectorized version
of the DDH variant introduced in [CRV10], in the style of the assumption that is used
in [BC14] to establish the DI property of a point function obfuscator. The assumption
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AssumptionS,A,G,t,d,poly(1
λ):
b ←$ {0, 1}; z ←$ {0, 1}poly(λ)
(w0,w1) ←$ S(1λ, z, )
~g ←$ Gt
Mb ←

~g[1]wb[1][1] . . . ~g[1]wb[1][d]
. . . . . . . . .
~g[t]wb[t][1] . . . ~g[t]wb[t][d]

b′ ←$ A(Mb, z)
return (b = b′)
Figure 4.5: Game defining a DDH-style computational assumption.
states that, for every unpredictable sampler, any distinguishing adversary has a negligible
advantage in the game in Figure 4.5. We note that the unpredictability restriction on the
sampler essentially excludes any challenge where a polynomial-size set of black-box linear
tests could be used by a semi-bounded predictor to distinguish the hidden bit. This is a
natural restriction, since the adversary is given enough information to trivially perform
such tests on its own. The assumption therefore states that ppt adversaries cannot do
better than what can be achieved with such linear tests. In particular, we note that such
linear tests can be used to extract coefficient equality patterns that might permit trivial
distinguishing attacks by checking group element repetitions in the received obfuscations.
DI obfuscation for hyperplane membership. The following theorem can be triv-
ially proven using a direct reduction.
Theorem 1. The hyperplane membership obfuscator of Canetti, Rothblum and Varia
[CRV10] is DI secure in the presence of random auxiliary information if the assumption
in Figure 4.5 holds in G. More precisely, for every unpredictable hyperplane membership
sampler S, any DI adversary A that breaks the DI property can be used (without change)
to break the underlying assumption with the same advantage.
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4.4 Instantiations and obfuscation-based attacks
A concrete instantiation of a CVGB obfuscator for point functions with auxiliary infor-
mation (AI) is given by Bitansky and Canetti [BC14]. This construction is based on
the hardness of a variant of the DDH assumption called strong vector-DDH (SVDDH)
assumption. The SVDDH assumption is an assumption that is formulated without ref-
erence to any auxiliary information. Recently, Bellare, Stepanovs and Tessaro [BST16]
have shown that the SVDDH assumption (and verifiable point obfuscation) in presence
of arbitrary AI is in contention with the existence of VGB obfuscation for general cir-
cuits (that is, one of the two cannot exist). We take a moment to clarify how these two
results relate to each other. In this discussion we assume that all obfuscation notions
are considered for a single circuit only (i.e. we do not consider composability). First,
note that the notion of AIPO (auxiliary-information point obfuscation) used in [BST16]
follows a notion equivalent to distributional indistinguishability where the right distri-
bution is fixed to be uniform. As shown in [BC14, Theorem 5.1] any point obfuscation
(without AI) is equivalent to VGB point obfuscation. It is also shown in [BC14, Propo-
sition A.3] that VGB obfuscation without AI is equivalent to VGB obfuscation with AI
for any circuit class. (Intuitively, to construct a simulator that works for all possible
AI, one uses the fact that the simulator is unbounded to find the best simulator that
works for a non-uniform adversary that takes a value of the AI as advice.) Together
with Proposition 2 above we get that all these notions (in their non-composable variants)
are equivalent. This then raises the question whether the results of [BST16] are also in
contention with PO without AI. To see that this does not follow from the equivalence of
notions, note that in Proposition 2 we crucially rely on a predictor that runs a possibly
unbounded simulator. Put differently, the AI must be statistically unpredictable. Indeed,
the results of [BST16] rely on special forms of AI which only computationally hide the
sampled point. (Roughly speaking, the AI contains a VGB obfuscation of a (non-point)
circuit that depends on the sampled point.) To avoid such attacks, and in line with the
above results, by considering statistically unpredictable samplers we constrain auxiliary
information to be statistically unpredictable.
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Chapter 5
Function Privacy: A Unified
Approach
The results described in this section have been published in [ABF16].
In this chapter, we define what function privacy for general functional encryption schemes
means and derive the model specific to keyword search schemes by restriction to point
circuit families. Our definition follows the indistinguishability-based approach to defining
FE security and comes with an analogous legitimacy condition that prevents the adversary
from learning the challenge bit simply by extracting a token for a circuit that has differing
outputs for the left and right challenge messages. The model extends the IND-CPA game
via a left-or-right (LR) oracle that returns ciphertexts and tokens for possibly correlated
messages and circuits. Since the adversary in this game has access to tokens that depend
on the challenge bit, we use the unpredictability framework of Chapter 3 to rule out
trivial guess attacks.
The game follows a left-or-right rather than a real-or-random formulation of the chal-
lenge oracle [BRS13a, BRS13b, ATR14, AAB+15] as this choice frees the definition from
restrictions that must be imposed to render samplers compatible with uniform distri-
bution over circuits. In particular, it allows the sampler to output low-entropy circuits
as long as they are functionally-equivalent on left and right. It also allows analyzing
security under repetitions of functionally-equivalent circuits in the presence of correlated
messages, which until now were properties captured separately by unlinkability [ATR14]
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and enhanced security [BRS13a], and never considered together, not even for the simple
case of point functions.
The sampler allows us to model, within a single game, (a) token-only adversarial
strategies via samplers that output no message, as the non-enhanced security model
in [BRS13a] and those in [BRS13b, ATR14]; (b) adversarial strategies that admit simple
correlations between encrypted messages and extracted circuits, as the enhanced security
model in [BRS13a] for point circuits that allows the adversary to obtain ciphertexts that
match the tokens; (c) adversarial strategies that admit arbitrary correlations between
extracted circuits and encrypted messages (i.e., not only exact matches).
Our model is functionality-agnostic and unifies all previous indistinguishability-based
models in this area. When restricted to point circuits or inner-products families, it gives
rise to a new privacy notion that offers significant improvements over those in prior
works [BRS13a, BRS13b, ATR14].
PRIV security. A functional encryption scheme FE is PRIV secure if, for every unpre-
dictable ppt sampler1 S and every ppt adversary A
AdvprivFE,A,S(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
PRIVA,SFE (1
λ)
]
− 1 ∈ Negl ,
where game PRIVA,SFE (1
λ) is defined in Figure 5.1. We exclude adversaries (A,S) that
attempt to trivially win the PRIV game via decryption tokens, by either extracting
them explicitly via the token-generation oracle, or implicitly via the left-or-right oracle.
Formally, the pair (A,S) is legitimate if, with overwhelming probability
∀(C0,C1) ∈ TList ,∀(m0,m1) ∈ MList : C0(m0) = C1(m1) .
Note also that for two sampler classes S1 and S2 with S1 ⊂ S2 security with respect to
samplers in S2 is a stronger security guarantee that one for those only in S1. In particular
a stronger restriction on sampler classes results in a weaker definition.
The definition also provides the adversary with the ability to adaptively obtain mul-
tiple challenges and tokens. However, similarly to unpredictability, a hybrid argument
1We limit samplers to ppt because in proving the security of our constructions, samplers are used to
construct computational adversaries against other schemes. In general, one could consider unbounded
samplers.
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PRIVA,SFE (1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
(C0,C1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
TList← TList : (C0,C1)
MList← MList : (m0,m1)
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk,Cb)
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk,mb)
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(C):
TList← TList : (C,C)
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk,C)
return tk
Figure 5.1: Game defining full privacy of a functional encryption scheme FE.
shows that for (stateless) samplers the definition self-composes and we consider the sim-
pler single-shot game in the remainder of the thesis.
Restricted PRIV and PRIV-TO. We call an adversary token-only if S does not output
any messages, and call the resulting security notion PRIV-TO. Note that, for token-only
adversaries, the additional legitimacy constraint above is redundant. We call an adversary
restricted if for every second-phase TGen query C2 there is a first-phase TGen query
C1 such that C2(mb) = C1(mb) for b ∈ {0, 1}. Intuitively, this amounts to imposing that
images exposed via second-stage queries (i.e., those placed after receiving the challenge)
can reveal no more than the images obtained in the first stage (i.e., from queries placed
before receiving the challenge). We call the resulting security notion Res-PRIV. We
emphasize that the Res-PRIV model inherits many of the strengths of the full PRIV
model such as arbitrary correlations and a wide range of adaptive token queries.2
5.1 The case of keyword search
Two important aspects of our definition are that it considers (1) challenge keywords that
do not match any of the encrypted messages and challenge messages that not match any
of the keywords—we call these keywords and messages unpaired ; and (2) low-entropy mes-
sages/keywords that are correlated with the high-entropy searches whose privacy must be
protected. The former aspect entails that the full equality pattern of challenge messages
and keywords may remain hidden from the adversary (and hence a wider class of non-
2When the restriction here is imposed on the IND-CPA model for point function, the resulting model
remains as strong as the full IND-CPA model.
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trivial attacks can be launched). Although the adversary always obtains the image matrix
resulting from evaluating tokens on ciphertexts (and hence sees the equality pattern be-
tween paired challenge keywords and messages), the repetition patterns among unpaired
messages or unpaired keywords is not necessarily leaked. In practice, this repetition
pattern may reveal sensitive information as well. Low entropy messages and keywords
model the presence of ciphertexts and tokens in the system, over which the uncertainty
of the adversary may be small, but which are correlated with sensitive data that must
still be protected. Indeed, our unpredictability notion allows the sampler to output such
low-entropy keywords and messages as long as low-entropy keywords are equal on left
and right. A real-or-random modeling of this setting cannot capture this scenario. When
low-entropy messages differ on the left and right, the adversary cannot learn them via the
TGen oracle due to the legitimacy condition: imposing that they are not leaked maps
to IND-CPA security. When they are equal on the left and right, they can be learned by
successive queries to the token extraction oracle, which permits capturing attack scenarios
where adaptive searches over low entropy correlated messages may be carried out. In par-
ticular, this permits an adversary to recover a correlated repetition search pattern after
the PRIV challenge has been revealed. As a result, low-entropy messages and keywords
are tolerated, even when correlated with other messages or keywords. Furthermore, the
values and equality patterns of high-entropy keywords are protected, as well as those of
all encrypted messages for which a token was not explicitly extracted. Our main results
in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 show the existence of keyword search schemes which are secure in
the aforementioned scenarios.
5.2 On revealing images
The outputs of challenge circuits on challenge messages can be always computed by
the adversary, and by imposing equality of images we ensure that they do not lead to
trivial distinguishing attacks. (This is similar to the legitimacy condition in FE security
models.) It is however less clear why these image values should be explicitly provide to
the predictor in the unpredictability game, even when they are equal for left and right
circuits-messages pairs. To see this, consider the sampler that for a random word w
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outputs
w0 = w, w1 = w, m0,i :=
w if w[i] = 1 ;w otherwise, and m1,i :=
w if w[i] = 1 ;w otherwise.
Note that C[w0](m0,i) = C[w1](m1,i) = w[i] and hence the images are equal on left and
right. Word w0 can be recovered bit by bit from the image values C[wb](m0,i) and com-
puting 1 − C[wb](w0) would then reveal the challenge bit b. Finally, without access to
the images C[w0](m0,i) the sampler can be shown to be unpredictable as w is chosen ran-
domly. On the other hand, in the presence of images, the sampler is trivially predicable.
This counterexample is similar to that briefly discussed in [ATR14] and can be modified
to show that the enhanced model of Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev [BRS13a] for the
so-called (k1, . . . , kT )-distributions is not achievable.
PRIV PRIV-TO
CPA
PRIV-TO ^ CPA
ResPRIV
ResPRIV ^ CPA
Figure 5.2: Relations among security notions for private functional encryption. (The
dotted implication only holds for keyword search schemes.)
5.3 Relations among notions
Clearly PRIV implies its weaker variant Res-PRIV, which in turn implies PRIV-TO. It
is not too difficult to see that PRIV also implies IND-CPA.3 A noteworthy consequence
of this is that for all-or-nothing functionalities (such as PEKS, IBE or ABE) any PRIV-
secure construction is also index hiding (aka. anonymous), whereby ciphertexts do not
leak any information about their intended recipients (i.e., about tokens that may per-
mit recovering the payload). Res-PRIV would imply a restricted analogue of IND-CPA
3Consider a sampler which does not output any circuits and simply returns (possibly low-entropy)
messages included in the state st passed to it. This sampler is trivially unpredictable. Furthermore, the
legitimacy conditions in the two games exactly match.
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(where images in the second phase should match one in the first phase), which for point
functions is equivalent to the standard IND-CPA model. IND-CPA security does not
imply PRIV-TO: consider an IND-CPA-secure scheme that is modified to append cir-
cuits in the clear to their tokens. PRIV-TO does not imply IND-CPA either: consider
a PRIV-TO-secure scheme that is modified to return messages in the clear with cipher-
texts. (Note that these separations hold even for point functions.) Figure 5.2 summarizes
relations among notions of security.
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Chapter 6
Function Private Constructions
The results described in this chapter have been published in [ATR14, ABF16].
In this chapter, we present the second and main contribution of this thesis: five con-
structions of private functional encryption supporting different classes of functions and
meeting varying degrees of security, namely (1) a white-box construction of an Anony-
mous IBE scheme based on composite-order groups, shown to be secure in the absence of
correlated messages; (2) a simple and functionality-agnostic black-box construction from
obfuscation, also shown to be secure in the absence of correlated messages; (3) a more
evolved and still functionality-agnostic construction that achieves a form of function pri-
vacy that tolerates limited correlations between messages and functions; (4) a KS scheme
achieving privacy in the presence of correlated messages beyond all previously proposed
indistinguishability-based security definitions; (5) a KS construction that achieves our
strongest notion of privacy (but relies on a more expressive form of obfuscation than the
previous construction).
6.1 Two white-box constructions of AIBE schemes
We start by looking at Boyen and Waters [BW06] anonymous identity-based encryption
scheme in the hope of showing that it already achieves some form of function privacy,
as the decryption keys are randomized. Towards this end, we first present a simplified
version of the original scheme and show that, in the random oracle model, not only IND-
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CPA security is still guaranteed, we are also able to lift the selective-id constraint in the
proof. Next, we show that the scheme is PRIV-TO secure up to two decryption keys. In
fact, we also show that if the sampler outputs three keys, there is a trivial distinguishing
attack. To improve security, we extend the scheme to groups of composite order and
show that the extended version is PRIV-TO secure for an unbounded number of keys.
Remark. Using the anonymous identity-based encryption (AIBE) to public-key encryp-
tion with keyword search (KS) transform from [ABC+08], one can easily derive keyword
search schemes where privacy guarantees of the keywords in KS are identical to those of
identities in AIBE [ATR14].
6.1.1 A simplified Boyen-Waters AIBE scheme in the RO model
Here, we construct a new anonymous identity-based encryption scheme based on that of
Boyen and Waters [BW06]. Our scheme relies on a bilinear groups of prime order. To
eliminate the selective-id constraint of the original scheme, we replace identities with their
hash values and model the hash function as a random oracle. Furthermore, we simplify the
scheme by removing two group elements from the public parameters and from decryption
keys, and obtain the final scheme in Figure 6.1. Compared to the original scheme, our
scheme also saves two exponentiations in the key-extraction and encryption algorithms,
and saves two pairing computations in the decryption algorithm. Our scheme preserves
the original security properties, provided that the hash function h, sampled from the
family Hλ : IdSpλ → G, is modeled as a random oracle. Added to this, the scheme
also has a weak form of token-only privacy where the sampler is (2,0)-bounded, i.e. the
sampler outputs circuit-vectors with at most 2 identities and no correlated messages.
Theorem 2. The anonymous identity-based encryption scheme AIBE1 [Figure 6.1] is
IND-CPA secure [Figure 2.5], in the random oracle model, assuming DBDH and DLIN are
intractable [Definitions 1 and 2]. More precisely, for any adversary A in game IND-CPA
against AIBE1, there exists adversaries B1 and B2 such that
Advind-cpaAIBE,A(λ) ≤ q ·AdvdbdhGP ,B1(λ) + q ·AdvdlinGP ,B2(λ) ,
where q is the number of queries A places to its random oracle.
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AIBE.Setup(1λ):
Γ ←$ GP(1λ)
(p,G,GT, e, g)← Γ
w, t1, t2 ←$ Zp
Ω← e(g, g)t1t2w
v1 ← gt1
v2 ← gt2
h ←$ Hλ
mpk← (Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)
msk← (w, t1, t2)
return (mpk,msk)
AIBE.KeyGen(mpk,msk, id):
(Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)← mpk
(p,G,GT, e, g)← Γ
(w, t1, t2)← msk
r ←$ Zp
h← h(id)
d0 ← grt1t2
d1 ← g−wt2 · h−rt2
d2 ← g−wt1 · h−rt1
skid ← (d0, d1, d2)
return skid
AIBE.Enc(mpk,m, id):
(Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)← mpk
(p,G,GT, e, g)← Γ
s, s1 ←$ Zp
h← h(id)
cˆ← Ωsm
c0 ← hs
c1 ← vs−s11
c2 ← vs12
c← (cˆ, c0, c1, c2)
return c
AIBE.Dec(mpk, skid, c):
(Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)← mpk
(p,G,GT, e, g)← Γ
(d0, d1, d2)← skid
(cˆ, c0, c1, c2)← c
e0 ← e(c0, d0)
e1 ← e(c1, d1)
e2 ← e(c2, d2)
m← cˆ · e0 · e1 · e2
return m
Figure 6.1: AIBE1, a simplified version of Boyen-Waters AIBE scheme.
Proof. The proof proceeds via a sequence of two game hops as follows.
Game0 : This game is identical to IND-CPA.
Game1 : In this game, we set cˆ ←$ GT instead of computing its value.
Game2 : We set c0←$ G. Here, the challenge ciphertext does not depend on the challenge
bit, therefore the advantage is 0.
We now reduce the distance between the games to the intractability of DBDH and DLIN
assumptions.
Game0 to Game1. Any adversary A with visible advantage difference in these two games
can be converted to an adversary B1 that breaks the DBDH assumption. More precisely,
we construct an adversary B1 [Figure 6.2] that interpolates between Game0 and Game1
by playing game DBDHB1GP (1
λ) [Figure 2.1]. The hash function h is modeled as a random
oracle and we assume, without loss of generality, that A always asks for the hash value of
id before querying id to oracles TGen or LR. Furthermore, for simplicity of exposition,
we assume that A places at most q queries to the random oracle, where q is bounded by
some polynomial in the security parameter λ, since A is required to run in polynomial-
time. B1 randomly tries to guess which query i ∈ {0, q−1} contains idb on which adversary
A asks to be challenged. When i is not successfully guessed, B1 simply aborts. But when
it is, which happens with probability 1
q
, B1 perfectly simulates Game0 if Z is of the form
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e(g, g)z1z2z3 , and perfectly simulates Game1 if Z is just a random element in GT. Notice
that this implies w = z1z2 and s = z3.
Random function h is consistently computed: if queried twice on the same id, the
same result is returned. When B1 successfully completes its execution, the function is set
to (gz1)x for every id but idb, and to g
x in this particular case, where x is a random value
sampled from Zp.
Challenge is well formed, as well as secret keys for random exponents r′ = r−z2
x
, where
x here is the value used to compute the hash of the corresponding id and r is sampled
from Zp. For completeness, we present the equalities between the original expressions and
those computed by B1. For cˆ we used the case where Z = e(g, g)z1z2z3 , which corresponds
to the simulation of Game0.
d0 = g
r′t1t2 = g
r−z2
x
t1t2 = g
rt1t2
x · g−z2t1t2x = g rt1t2x · Z
−t1t2
x
2
d1 = g
−wt2 · h−r′t2 = g−z1z2t2 · [(gz1)x]− r−z2x t2 = Z−rt21
d2 = g
−wt1 · h−r′t1 = g−z1z2t1 · [(gz1)x]− r−z2x t1 = Z−rt11
cˆ = Ωs ·m = [e(g, g)t1t2w]s ·m = [e(g, g)t1t2z1z2 ]z3 ·m = Zt1t2 ·m
c0 = h
s = (gx)z3 = Zx3
c1 = v
s−s1
1 = (g
t
1)
z3−s1 = (Z3 · g−s1)t1
c2 = v
s1
2
Therefore, we have that Pr[Game0(1
λ)]− Pr[Game1(1λ)] ≤ q ·AdvdbdhGP ,B1(λ).
Game1 to Game2. For A to successfully distinguish between Game1 and Game2, the
DLIN assumption would have to be tractable. Formally, we show this by constructing an
algorithm B2 [Figure 6.3] that interpolates between Game1 and Game2 by playing game
DLINB2GP (1
λ) [Figure 2.1]. As before, the hash function h is modeled as a random oracle to
which A places at most q queries and we assume that A always asks for the hash value
of id before querying it to TGen or LR oracles. Employing the same strategy as before,
algorithm B2 randomly tries to guess which query i ∈ {0, q−1} contains idb. When i is
successfully guessed, which happens with probability at least 1
q
, B2 perfectly simulates
Game1 if Z is of the form g
z3+z4 , and perfectly simulates Game2 otherwise. This implies
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B1(Γ,Z1,Z2,Z3,Z):
t1, t2 ←$ Zp
Ω← e(Z1,Z2)t1t2
v1 ← gt1
v2 ← gt2
mpk← (Ω, v1, v2)
counter ← 0
i? ←$ {0, q−1}
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ AH,TGen,LR(mpk)
return (b = b′)
H(id):
(x, i)← list[id]
if (x =⊥)
x ←$ Zp
i← counter
counter ← counter + 1
list[id]← (x, i)
if (i = i?) h← gx
else h← Zx1
return h
TGen(id):
(x, i)← list[id]
if (i = i?) abort
r ←$ Zp
d0 ← g
rt1t2
x · Z
−t1t2
x
2
d1 ← Z−rt21
d2 ← Z−rt11
skid ← (d0, d1, d2)
return skid
LR((id0,m0), (id1,m1)):
(x, i)← list[idb]
if (i 6= i?) abort
s1 ←$ Zp
cˆ← Zt1t2 ·mb
c0 ← Zx3
c1 ← Zt13 · g−t1s1
c2 ← vs12
c← (cˆ, c0, c1, c2)
return c
Figure 6.2: DBDH adversary B1, as part of proof of Theorem 2.
that t1 = z1 and t2 = z2. Random function h sets (g
z2)x for every id but the idb, which is
set to gx, where x is a random value sampled from Zp. Challenge is well formed, as well
as secret keys for random exponents r′ = r
z2
, where r is sampled from Zp. Finally, notice
that s = z3 + z4 and s1 = z4, and that t1, t2, r
′, s and s1 are uniformly distributed over
Zp, as they should be. For completeness, we present the equalities between the original
expressions and those computed by B2. For c0 we used the case where Z = gz3+z4 , which
corresponds to the simulation of Game1.
d0 = g
r′t1t2 = g
r
z2
z1z2 = (gz1)r = Zr1
d1 = g
−wt2 · h−r′t2 = g−wz2 · [(gz2)x]− rz2 z2 = Z−w2 · Z−xr2 = Z−w−xr2
d2 = g
−wt1 · h−r′t1 = g−wz1 · [(gz2)x]− rz2 z1 = Z−w1 · Z−xr1 = Z−w−xr1
c0 = h
s = (gx)z3+z4 = Zx
c1 = v
s−s1
1 = (g
z1)(z3+z4)−z4 = Z13
c2 = v
s1
2 = (g
z2)z4 = Z24
Therefore, we have that Pr[Game1(1
λ)] − Pr[Game2(1λ)] ≤ q ·AdvdlinGP ,B2(λ) . In Game2,
the challenge ciphertext is independent of the challenge bit b, which concludes our proof.
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B2(Γ,Z1,Z2,Z13,Z24,Z):
w ←$ Zp
Ω← e(Z1,Z2)w
v1 ← Z1; v2 ← Z2
mpk← (Ω, v1, v2)
i ←$ {0, q−1}
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ AH,TGen,LR(mpk)
return (b = b′)
H(id):
(x, i)← list[id]
if (x =⊥)
x ←$ Zp
i← counter
counter ← counter + 1
list[id]← (x, i)
if (i = i?) h← gx
else h← Zx2
return h
TGen(id):
(x, i)← list[id]
if (i = i?) abort
r ←$ Zp
d0 ← Zr1
d1 ← Z−w−xr2
d2 ← Z−w−xr1
skid ← (d0, d1, d2)
return skid
LR((id0,m0), (id1,m1)):
(x, i)← list[idb]
if (i 6= i?) abort
cˆ ←$ GT
c0 ← Zx
c1 ← Z13
c2 ← Z24
c← (cˆ, c0, c1, c2)
return c
Figure 6.3: DLIN adversary B2, as part of proof of Theorem 2.
Besides being IND-CPA secure, we show that scheme AIBE1 also has a weak form of
token-only privacy against unpredictable samplers outputting at most 2 identities and no
correlated messages.
Theorem 3. The anonymous identity-based encryption scheme AIBE1 [Figure 6.1] is
PRIV-TO secure against unpredictable samplers that are (2, 0)-bounded and functionally-
differing, in the random oracle model, assuming DLIN is intractable [Definition 2].
Proof. Let (S,A) be a legitimate adversary in game PRIV-TOS,AAIBE1 [Figure 5.1]. S is
(2, 0)-bounded and functionally-differing. The proof proceeds as a sequence of two games
hops.
Game0 : This game is identical to PRIV-TO game.
Game1 : In this game, we set a bad event in case the adversary A queries to the random
oracle any of the identities output by S.
Game2 : Independently of the bit b, we always extract the challenge decryption keys as
if b = 1. Since the challenge keys do not depend on the challenge bit, the advantage
here is 0.
We now analyse the distance between the games.
Game0 to Game1. An adversary A that triggers the bad even can easily be used by a
predictor P to break the unpredictability of S, as asking for any of the identities output
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by S, which is functionally-differing, amounts to break its unpredictability. Therefore,
Pr[Game0(1
λ)]− Pr[Game1(1λ)] ≤ AdvpredS,P (λ).
Game1 to Game2. Let id0 and id1 be the two challenge vectors output by S, each
containing at most two identities–recall that S is (2, 0)-bounded. It can either be that:
1. id0[0] 6= id0[1] ∧ id1[0] 6= id1[1]
2. id0[0] = id0[1] ∧ id1[0] = id1[1]
3. id0[0] = id0[1] ∧ id1[0] 6= id1[1]
4. id0[0] 6= id0[1] ∧ id1[0] = id1[1]
From the adversary’s point of view, Case 1 and Case 2 are identical in Game1 and Game2,
as the adversary has no access to the hash values of any of the identities. Case 3 and
Case 4 are symmetric.
By building an adversary B1 [Figure 6.4] that plays game DLINB1GP (1λ) [Figure 2.1] and
simulates game Game1 in such a way that A’s guess can be forward to game DLINB1GP (1λ),
we upper-bound the distance between Game1 and Game2 to the hardness of deciding on
an instance of this problem.
The master secret key is set as following: t1 = z1, t2 = z1 · a for random a ∈ Zp, and
w = z3·b
z1
for random b ∈ Zp. Although the values of t1, t2 and w are unknown to B1, the
corresponding public parameters can still be consistently computed:
Ω = e(g, g)t1t2w = e(g, g)
z1z1a
z3·b
z1 = e(Z13, g)
ab
v1 = g
t1 = Z1
v2 = g
t2 = (Z1)
a
The hash function H is modeled as a random oracle and set to (gz1)x ·g− 1y , for random
(x, y) ∈ Z2p. We assume, without loss of generality, that A always asks for the hash value
of id before querying id to oracle TGen. Whenever asked to extract a private key on some
id, we set r = w · y, where y is the value used to compute the hash of that particular id.
Note that this still makes r uniformly distributed over Zp and independent of h and w.
Given this, private keys can be extracted as follows:
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d0 = g
rt1t2 = gwyt1t2 = g
z3·b
z1
yz1z1a = (Z13)
aby
d1 = g
−wt2 · h−rt2 = g−wt2 · [(gz1)x · g− 1y ]−wyt2 = g−z1xwyt2 = g−z1x
z3·b
z1
yz1a = (Z13)
−abxy
d2 = g
−wt1 · h−rt1 = g−wt1 · [(gz1)x · g− 1y ]−wyt1 = g−z1xwyt1 = g−z1x
z3·b
z1
yz1 = (Z13)
−bxy
To complete the simulation, we extract two private keys to challenge A, such that
these private keys are for the same id if B1 received a valid DLIN tuple, and for different
ids otherwise. Let sk? = (d?0, d
?
1, d
?
2) and sk
◦ = (d◦0, d
◦
1, d
◦
2) be the challenge keys. We set
h = gz1z4 , r? = b
(z1)2
and r◦ = z2+b
(z1)2
. Note that h is uniformly distributed over G, and r? and
r◦ are uniformly distributed over Zp, independent of each other and of w. For complete-
ness, we present the equalities between the original expressions and those computed by B1:
d?0 = g
r?t1t2 = g
b
(z1)
2 z1z1a = gab
d?1 = g
−wt2 · h−r?t2 = g−
z3b
z1
z1a · (gz1z4)−
b
(z1)
2 z1a = (g−ab)z3 · (g−ab)z4 = Z−ab
d?1 = g
−wt1 · h−r?t1 = g−
z3b
z1
z1 · (gz1z4)−
b
(z1)
2 z1 = (g−b)z3 · (g−b)z4 = Z−b
d◦0 = g
r◦t1t2 = g
z2+b
(z1)
2 z1z1·a = gz2·a+ab = (Z2)a · gab
d◦1 = g
−wt2 · h−r◦t2 = g−
z3b
z1
z1a · (gz1z4)−
z2+b
(z1)
2 z1a = (g−ab)(z3+z4) · (gz2z4)−a = Z−ab · (Z24)−a
d◦2 = g
−wt1 · h−r◦t1 = g−
z3b
z1
z1 · (gz1z4)−
z2+b
(z1)
2 z1 = (g−b)(z3+z4) · (gz2z4)−1 = Z−b · (Z24)−1
Therefore, we have that
Pr[Game1(1
λ)]− Pr[Game2(1λ)] ≤ Pr[Game1(1λ)]− 1
2
=
1
2
·AdvdlinGP ,B1(λ).
To conclude our proof:
Advpriv-toAIBE1,(S,A)(λ) ≤ 2 ·Adv
pred
S,P (λ) + Adv
dlin
GP ,B1(λ).
One might wonder why AIBE1 is function private only up to two keys, and why we
cannot extend the result by applying a standard hybrid argument [BBM00]. We answer
this questions by means of a concrete attack against scheme.
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B1(Γ,Z1,Z2,Z13,Z24,Z):
a ←$ Zp, b ←$ Zp
Ω← e(Z13, g)ab
v1 ← Z1
v2 ← (Z1)a
mpk← (Ω, v1, v2)
b′ ←$ AH,TGen,LR(mpk)
if (id0[0] = id0[1]) return b
′
else return ¬b′
H(id):
(x, y)← list[id]
if ((x, y) =⊥)
x ←$ Zp
y ←$ Zp
list[id]← (x, y)
h← (gz1)x · g− 1y
return h
TGen(id):
(x, y)← list[id]
d0 ← (Z13)aby
d1 ← (Z13)−abxy
d2 ← (Z13)−bxy
skid ← (d0, d1, d2)
return skid
LR(st):
(id0, id1) ←$ S(st)
d?0 ← gab
d?1 ← Z−ab
d?2 ← Z−b
sk0 ← (d?0, d?1, d?2)
d◦0 ← (Z2)a · gab
d◦1 ← Z−ab · (Z24)−a
d◦2 ← Z−b · (Z24)−1
sk1 ← (d◦0, d◦1, d◦2)
return (sk0, sk1)
Figure 6.4: DLIN adversary B1, as part of proof of Theorem 3.
Suppose we have a (3, 0)-bounded sampler S that samples id0 and id1 uniformly at
random from IdSpλ and outputs ((id0, id0, id0), (id0, id0, id1)). S is clearly unpredictable.
Let (sk0, sk1, sk2) be the challenge decryption keys that adversary A receives. The goal
of A is to decide whether all these keys are associated with the same identity or not. We
further expand ski to (di0, di1, di2) according to our scheme. If the keys were generated
honestly, i.e. by following the algorithm AIBE1.KeyGen() as described in Figure 6.1, the
adversary simply has to check if
e(
d10
d00
,
d21
d01
)
?
= e(
d00
d20
,
d01
d11
)
to determine the form of the tuple. If the equality is true, then the three secret keys have
been extracted from the same id1. If the result is false, then keys have been extracted
from (id0, id0, id1). For completeness, we show this by expanding and simplifying the
1Collisions in the hash function h may lead to false positive results but only occur with negligible
probability.
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above expression.
e(
d10
d00
,
d21
d01
) = e(
d00
d20
,
d01
d11
)⇔
e(
gr1t1t2
gr0t1t2
,
g−wt2 · h−r2t22
g−wt2 · h−r0t20
) = e(
gr0t1t2
gr2t1t2
,
g−wt2 · h−r0t20
g−wt2 · h−r1t21
)⇔
e(
gr1t1t2
gr0t1t2
,
h−r2t22
h−r0t20
) = e(
gr0t1t2
gr2t1t2
,
h−r0t20
h−r1t20
)⇔
e(g(r1−r0), hr00 · h−r22 )t1(t2)
2
= e(g(r0−r2), h(r1−r0)0 )t1(t2)
2 ⇔
e(g, hr00 · h−r22 ) = e(g, h(r0−r2)0 )⇔
h2 = h0
Therefore, we come to the interesting conclusion that AIBE1 is PRIV-TO secure
against (2, 0)-bounded samplers, yet completely insecure against (t, 0)-bounded samplers,
for t > 2.
6.1.2 An extended version over composite-order groups
We extend AIBE1 to groups of composite order and obtain AIBE2 [Figure 6.5]. The exten-
sion is very simple: let all the parameters in the original scheme be from the subgroup Gp
(generated by gp) and randomize each element of the extracted secret key by a random
element from the subgroup Gq (generated by gq). Note that the message space is GT.
AIBE.Setup(1λ):
(p, q,G,GT, e, g) ←$ GC(1λ)
n← pq; gp ← gq; gq ← gp
Γ← (n,G,GT, e, g, gp, gq)
w, t1, t2 ←$ Zn
Ω← e(gp, gp)t1t2w
v1 ← gt1p
v2 ← gt2p
h ←$ Hλ
mpk← (Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)
msk← (w, t1, t2)
return (msk,mpk)
AIBE.KeyGen(mpk,msk, id):
(w, t1, t2)← msk
(Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)← mpk
(n,G,GT, e, g, gp, gq)← Γ
r ←$ Zn
x0, x1, x2 ←$ Gq
h← h(id)
d0 ← x0 · grt1t2p
d1 ← x1 · g−wt2p · h−rt2
d2 ← x2 · g−wt1p · h−rt1
sk← (d0, d1, d2)
return sk
AIBE.Enc(mpk,m, id):
(Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)← mpk
(n,G,GT, e, g, gp, gq)← Γ
s, s1 ←$ Zn
h← h(id)
cˆ← Ωsm
c0 ← hs
c1 ← vs−s11
c2 ← vs12
c← (cˆ, c0, c1, c2)
return c
AIBE.Dec(mpk, skid, c):
(Γ,Ω, v1, v2, h)← mpk
(n,G,GT, e, g, gp, gq)← Γ
(d0, d1, d2)← skid
(cˆ, c0, c1, c2)← c
e0 ← e(c0, d0)
e1 ← e(c1, d1)
e2 ← e(c2, d2)
m← cˆ · e0 · e1 · e2
return m
Figure 6.5: AIBE2, an extended version of AIBE scheme AIBE1, over composite-order
groups.
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The decryption algorithm remains correct, since
e0 = e(h
s, x0 · grt1t2p ) = e(hs, grt1t2p )
e1 = e(v
s−s1
1 , x1 · g−wt2p · h−rt2) = e(vs−s11 , g−wt2p · h−rt2)
e2 = e(v
s1
2 , x2 · g−wt1p · h−rt1) = e(vs12 , g−wt1p · h−rt1)
Also, IND-CPA secure is preserved, assuming DBDH and DLIN hold in Gp. However, we
show that the extra randomization of the decryption keys enhances the function privacy
guarantees (previously limited to only two keys) to an arbitrary number.
First, we introduce a new hardness assumption over composite order groups. We call
this assumption the Composite Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CDDH) and show that it is
weaker than the Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumption made in [BW07]
by Boneh and Waters.
Definition 4. We say the CDDH assumption holds for group generator GC if for every
ppt adversary A we have that
AdvcddhGC ,A(λ) := 2 · Pr[CDDHAGC(1λ)]− 1 ∈ Negl,
where game CDDH is described in Figure 6.6.
CDDHAGC (1
λ):
(p, q,G,GT, e, g) ←$ GC(1λ)
n← pq; gp ← gq; gq ← gp
Γ← (n,G,GT, e, g, gp, gq)
X1,X2,X3 ←$ Gq
a, b ←$ Zn
b ←$ {0, 1}
if (b = 0) then R← X3(gp)ab
else R ←$ G
b′ ←$ A(Γ,X1(gp)a,X2(gp)b,R)
return (b = b′)
Figure 6.6: Game defining CDDH computational assumption.
In game C3DH, adversary is given a tuple (Γ′, gp, gq, (gp)a, (gp)b,X1(gp)ab,X2(gp)abc,Z)
and has to decide whether Z = X3(gp)
c, for some X3 ∈ Gq. For convenience, we rewrite
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this as (Γ′, gp, gq, (gp)a, (gp)b,X1(gp)ab,Y, X3(gp)c), where Y is either X2(gp)abc or random
in G. Now, notice that (Γ′, gp, gq, X1(gp)ab,X3(gp)c,Y) is a CDDH tuple. Therefore,
CDDH is a weaker assumption than C3DH.
We now show our main result for this construction. Assuming the hardness of CDDH,
we prove that AIBE2 is PRIV-TO secure for an arbitrary number of challenge keys.
Theorem 4. The anonymous identity-based encryption scheme AIBE2 [Figure 6.5] is
PRIV-TO secure against unpredictable samplers that are functionally-differing, in the
random oracle model, assuming CDDH is intractable [Definition 4].
Proof. Let (A,S) be a legitimate adversary against the PRIV-TO security of AIBE2,
where S is functionally-differing and outputs two vectors of t identities. The proof follows
a hybrid argument. The challenger starts by extracting decryption keys from the left side,
as if b = 0. Then, through a sequence of game, the challenger extracts the keys from
random identities, replacing one key at the time. We argue the indistinguishability of
each game hop with the hardness of CDDH. Finally, the challenger proceeds extracting
each key from the right vector of identities output by the sampler, again, replacing one
challenge key at the time. At the end, the challenger extracts decryption keys from the
right side, as if b = 1.
Game0 : This game is identical to PRIV-TO game when the challenge bit b = 0.
Game1 : In this game, we set a bad event in case the adversary A queries to the random
oracle any of the identities output by S. This hop is down to the unpredictability
of the sampler, given that S is functionally-differing.
Game(2,i), for i ∈ {0, t} : Instead of extracting a decryption key for id0[i], we extract
a decryption key for a random id ∈ IdSpλ. Game(2,0) is the same as Game1. In
Game(2,t) all decryption keys of the challenge are extracted from independently
sampled random identities. We construct an adversary Bi that plays the CDDH
game and simulates either Game(2,(i−1)) or Game(2,i), depending on the random bit
of game CDDH. Bi sets h(id0[i]) to (gp)a, and to extract ski it sets the randomness
r to b. Notice that ski is easily computable with the CDDH tuple, even without
actually knowing the value of (gp)
a or b. If Bi has to extracts several keys for
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h(id0[i])—because of the sampler’s choices—it extracts all the other decryption
keys with independent random coins, instead of fixing r to be b. In this way, ski
is a decryption key for identity id0[i] if the CDDH tuple is well-formed, and is
a decryption key for a uniformly sampled identity if it is not. Thus, the distance
between Game(2,(i−1)) and Game(2,i) is bounded by the advantage of Bi against game
CDDH. We describe the internal functioning of algorithm Bi in Figure 6.7.
Game(3,i), for i ∈ {0, t} : Instead of extracting the ith decryption from a random id ∈
IdSpλ, we extract the decryption key from id1[i]. The argument is similar to the
previous game hops.
Game4 : In this game, we remove the bad event introduced earlier in Game1. Again,
this hop is down to the unpredictability of S. This game is identical to PRIV-TO
game when the challenge bit b = 1.
Therefore, we have that
Advpriv-toAIBE2,(S,A)(λ) ≤ 2 ·Adv
pred
S,P (λ) + 2t ·AdvcddhGC ,B(λ).
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Bi(Γ,Za,Zb,Zab):
(n,G,GT, e, g, gp, gq)← Γ
w, t1, t2 ←$ Zn
Ω← e(gp, gp)t1t2w
v1 ← gt1p
v2 ← gt2p
mpk← (Γ,Ω, v1, v2)
msk← (w, t1, t2)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ AH,TGen,LR(mpk)
return (b = b′)
H(id):
h← list[id]
if (h =⊥)
h ←$ Gp
list[id]← h
return h
TGen(id):
skid ←$ AIBE.KeyGen(mpk,msk, id)
return skid
LR(st):
(id0, id1) ←$ S(st)
for j ∈ {0, (i− 1)}
id ←$ IdSpλ
sk[j] ←$ AIBE.KeyGen(mpk,msk, id)
id? ← id0[i]
x0, x1, x2 ←$ Gq
d0 ← x0 · Zt1t2b
d1 ← x1 · Z−t2ab · (gp)−wt2
d2 ← x2 · Z−t1ab · (gp)−wt1
sk[i]← (d0, d1, d2)
for j ∈ {(i+ 1), t}
if (id0[j] = id
?)
r ←$ Zn
x0, x1, x2 ←$ Gq
d0 ← x0 · grt1t2p
d1 ← x1 · Z−rt2a · (gp)−wt2
d2 ← x2 · Z−rt1a · (gp)−wt1
sk[j]← (d0, d1, d2)
else
sk[j] ←$ AIBE.KeyGen(mpk,msk, id0[j])
return sk
Figure 6.7: CDDH adversary Bi, as part of proof of Theorem 4.
6.2 The obfuscate-extract (OX) transform
Our first black-box construction formalizes the intuition that obfuscating circuits before
computing a token for them will provide some form of token privacy.
The OX transform. Let Obf be an obfuscator supporting a circuit family CSp and
let FE be a functional encryption scheme supporting all polynomial-size circuits. We
construct a functional encryption scheme OX[FE,Obf] via the OX transform as follows.
Setup, encryption and evaluation algorithms are identical to those of the base func-
tional encryption scheme. The token-generation algorithm creates a token for the circuit
that results from obfuscating the extracted circuit, i.e. OX[FE,Obf].TGen(msk,C) :=
FE.TGen(msk,Obf(1λ,C)). Correctness of this construction follows from those of its un-
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derlying components. We now show that this construction yields function privacy against
PRIV-TO adversaries. Since PRIV-TO does not imply IND-CPA security—see the dis-
cussion in Section 5.3—we establish IND-CPA security independently. The proof of the
following theorem is straightforward and results from direct reductions to the base FE
and Obf schemes used in the construction.
Theorem 5 (OX is PRIV-TO ∧ IND-CPA). If obfuscator Obf is DI secure, then scheme
OX[FE,Obf] is PRIV-TO secure. Furthermore, if FE is IND-CPA secure OX[FE,Obf] is
IND-CPA secure.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and results from direct reductions to the underlying
components used in the construction. We start by proving that OX[FE,Obf] is PRIV-TO-
secure for a circuits family CSp and (circuits-only) sampler class S if Obf is DI-secure for
CSp and S. Given an adversary (S,A1) against PRIV-TO security of OX[FE,Obf], we
construct an adversary (S ′,B1) against the DI security of Obf as follows. We set S ′ to
be the same as S. Algorithm B1 runs FE.Gen(1λ) to generate on its own a master secret
key and master public key pair (msk,mpk). Then, B1 runs A1 on mpk, answering all its
token-generation queries by running FE.TGen(msk, ·), until A1 calls LR on some state st.
At this point, B1 calls its own LR oracle on st and receives as a challenge a vector of
obfuscated circuits. B1 generates a token for each circuit, and forwards the result to A1.
Thereafter, B1 continues running A1, answering its second-stage token-generation queries
as before until A1 outputs a bit b′, which B1 outputs as its own guess. The simulation is
perfect and S ′ is unpredictable because S is unpredictable.
We now prove the second part of the theorem, i.e. that OX[FE,Obf] is IND-CPA-secure
if FE is. Let A2 be an adversary against IND-CPA security of OX[FE,Obf]. We construct
an adversary B2 against IND-CPA security of FE. Algorithm B2(mpk) runs A2(mpk),
answering its first-stage TGen(C) queries by first computing an obfuscation C of circuit
C, placing a token-generation query on C to its own TGen oracle, and forwarding the
token to A2. When A2 asks to be challenged on messages (m0,m1), B2 calls its own
LR oracle on these messages and forwards the challenge ciphertext to A2. Second-stage
TGen queries are answered as before. Finally, B2 outputs A2’s guess b′ as its own guess.
Here again, the simulation is perfect and legitimacy of B2 follows from the legitimacy
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of A2 and the fact that the obfuscator preserves the functionality of the circuit, which
means that B2 has precisely the same advantage as A2. Therefore, we conclude that
Advpriv-toOX[FE,Obf],S,A1(λ) = Adv
di
Obf,S,B1(λ), and that
Advind-cpaOX[FE,Obf],A2(λ) = Adv
ind-cpa
FE,B2 (λ) .
We note that this proof holds for arbitrary classes of circuits and arbitrary (circuits-
only) samplers. Using the composable VGB point-function obfuscator of Bitansky and
Canetti [BC14] and any secure functional encryption scheme that is powerful enough to
support one exponentiation and one equality test (e.g. supports NC1 circuits) we ob-
tain a private keyword search scheme in the presence of tokens for arbitrarily correlated
keywords. If the underlying functional encryption scheme supports the more powerful
functionality that permits attaching a payload to the point, one obtains a PRIV-TO
anonymous identity-based encryption scheme where arbitrary correlations are tolerated.
In this case, on input (id,m), the functionality supported by the underlying FE scheme
would return m if C(id) = 1, where C was sampled from Obf(C[id?]) during token gener-
ation; it would return ⊥ otherwise.
The above theorem shows that DI is sufficient to build a PRIV-TO scheme. It is
however easy to see that the existence of a single-circuit DI obfuscator is also neces-
sary. Indeed, given any PRIV-TO scheme FE we can DI-obfuscate a single circuit C by
generating a fresh FE key pair, and outputting FE.Eval(·, tk) where tk is a token for C.
Proposition 4 (PRIV-TO vs. DI). A PRIV-TO-secure functional encryption for a cir-
cuits family CSp exists if a DI obfuscator for CSp exists. Conversely, a single-circuit DI
obfuscator for CSp exists if a PRIV-TO-secure functional encryption for CSp exists.
Proof. We first describe the operation of the required obfuscator. Given a circuit C, the
required obfuscator Obf generates an FE key pair (mpk,msk) and uses the master secret
key to extract a token tk for C. It then defines the obfuscated circuit to be one that
first encrypts m under mpk using trivial random coins, and then evaluates the resulting
ciphertext using tk, i.e. the circuit
C[mpk, tk](·) := FE.Eval(FE.Enc(·,mpk; 0poly(λ)), tk) .
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The correctness of this obfuscator follows from that of the FE scheme. The proof of DI
security for this construction with respect to samplers that output a single circuit pair
is a direct reduction to PRIV-TO. We construct a PRIV-TO adversary that uses the
DI sampler without change and does nothing in the first stage. In the second stage,
on obtaining the challenge token tk, constructs C[mpk, tk](·) and passes it on to the DI
distinguisher. It will return whatever the distinguisher outputs. This simulation is easily
seen to be perfect.
Remark. For arbitrary DI samplers the argument above fails. This is due to the
fact that communication between the sampler and the distinguisher is restricted (by the
unpredictability condition) and hence hybrid arguments cannot be made to go through.
A similar line of reasoning shows that the extractor-based constructions of private FE
by Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev [BRS13a] and Arriaga, Tang and Ryan [ATR14] give
rise to single-circuit DI obfuscators for point functions for the specific classes of samplers
considered in those works.
Agrawal et al. [AAB+15] have proposed a simulation-based definition of privacy that
strikes a different balance between practical relevance and feasibility. However, the
definition in [AAB+15] implies VBB obfuscation, which is known to be feasible only
for restricted classes of circuits [BR14a, BBC+14] or in idealized models of computa-
tion [CV13, BR14b, BGK+14]. The above proposition shows that our model is closer to
the weaker form of DI obfuscation, which as shown in Proposition 2 is implied by CVGB.
The particular case of single-circuit DI obfuscation is implied by VGB (and hence VBB)
obfuscation. Therefore, our model is more amenable to instantiations in the standard
model.
6.3 The trojan-obfuscate-extract (TOX) transform
We now present a generic construction that achieves Res-PRIV security for a class of sam-
plers that we call concentrated. To this end, we build on the ideas from [ABSV15, DIJ+13]
on converting selective to adaptive security and achieving simulation-based security from
IND-CPA security for FE schemes.
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The TOX transform. Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE, a general-purpose
obfuscator Obf and a functional encryption FE for all circuits, our Trojan-Obfuscate-
Extract (TOX) transform operates as follows. The master public key of the scheme is the
same as that of the base FE scheme. Its master secret key includes a symmetric key k
and the master secret key for the base FE scheme. To encrypt a message m we call the
base FE encryption routine on (0, 0λ,m). To generate a token for a circuit C, we first
generate an obfuscation C¯ ←$ Obf(C), a ciphertext c ←$ SE.Enc(k, 0n) and construct the
following circuit.
Troj[C¯, c](b, k,m) :=
 C¯(m) if b = 0 ;C∗(m) if b = 1, where C∗ = SE.Dec(k, c) .
Finally, we extract a token for Troj[C¯, c]. Evaluation simply invokes the corresponding
operation in the underlying FE.
The correctness and IND-CPA security of this construction follow easily from the
correctness and IND-CPA security of the underlying functional encryption scheme via
straightforward reductions. Intuitively, during the normal operation of the scheme, the
tokens in the construction will simply evaluate an obfuscation of the extracted circuit. In
the proof of privacy, however, we will take advantage of the fact that a totally independent
circuit can be hidden inside the token within the symmetric encryption ciphertext, and
unlocked by a message containing the correct symmetric decryption key. For the proof to
go through, the hidden circuit must be carefully selected so that the legitimacy condition
is observed throughout. In order to meet this latter restriction, we consider the following
constrained class of samplers.
Concentrated samplers. We say a sampler S is S∗-concentrated if for all st, all
CSpλ-vectors C we have that
Pr [C(m0) = C(m1) 6= C(m∗)] ∈ Negl and Pr [C0(m0) 6= C∗(m∗)] ∈ Negl,
where the probability space of these is defined by the operations (C∗,m∗) ←$ S∗(z,C)
and (C0,C1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st).
Concentration is a property independent of unpredictability and we will be relying on
both in our construction. Unpredictability is used in the reduction to the DI assumption.
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Concentration guarantees the existence of a sampler S∗ that generates circuits C∗ and
messages m∗ which permit decoupling circuits and messages in the security proof. Intu-
itively, quantification over all C means that adversarially generated circuits will lead to
image matrices that collide with those leaked by the sampler with overwhelming prob-
ability. The additional restriction on C∗(m∗) guarantees that one can switch from the
honest branch of challenge tokens to one corresponding to the trojan branch. Both of
these properties are important to guarantee legitimacy when making a reduction to the
security of the FE scheme. We however need to impose that legitimacy also holds for
second-phase TGen queries as well, and this is where we need to assume Res-PRIV
security: the extra legitimacy condition allows us to ensure that by moving to m∗ the
legitimacy condition is not affected in the second phase either. Finally, an important ob-
servation is that, because we are dealing with concentrated samplers, our security proof
goes through assuming obfuscators that need only tolerate random auxiliary information.
Theorem 6 (TOX is Res-PRIV). If obfuscator Obf is DI secure, SE is IND-CPA se-
cure and FE is IND-CPA secure, then scheme TOX[FE,Obf, SE] is Res-PRIV secure with
respect to concentrated samplers.
Proof. The proof proceeds via a sequence of three games as follows.
Game0 : This game is identical to Res-PRIV: challenge vector Cb is extracted and mb
is encrypted for a random bit b and for all TGen queries, string 0n is encrypted
using SE in the trojan branch.
Game1 : In this game, instead of 0
n we encrypt the circuits queried to the (first or
second-phase) TGen oracle under a symmetric key k∗ in the trojan branch. In
the challenge phase, we sample (C∗,m∗) ←$ S∗(z,C), where C are all first-phase
TGen queries, and encrypt C∗ under k∗ for the challenge circuits in the trojan
branch. This transition is negligible down to IND-CPA security of SE.
Game2 : In this game, instead of encrypting (0, 0,mb) we encrypt (1, k
∗,m∗) in the
challenge phase where the latter is generated using S∗(z,C). We reduce this hop
to the IND-CPA security of FE. We generate a key k∗, answer first-stage TGen
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queries using the provided TGen oracle and encrypt circuits under k∗ in the tro-
jan branch to get st. We run S(st) and get (C0,m0,C1,m1, z). We then run
S∗(z,C), where C are all first-phase TGen queries, to get (C∗,m∗). We prepare
challenges tokens by encrypting C∗ under k∗ in the trojan branch and using the
provided TGen oracle we generate the challenge tokens. We query the provided
LR on (0, 0,mb) and (1, k
∗,m∗) and receive the corresponding vector of cipher-
texts. Second-stage TGen queries are handled using provided TGen oracle and
k∗. Finally, we return the same bit that the distinguisher returns. Legitimacy of
first-stage TGen queries follows from the first condition on concentration that with
high probability C(mb) = C(m
∗). For the challenge tokens, this follows from the
second concentration requirement that Cb(mb) = C
∗(m∗). For the second-stage
queries we rely on the restriction on the adversary. Recall that in the Res-PRIV
model, any second-stage queries must have an image vector which matches one for
a first-stage query. Since the first-stage images match those on m∗ (and hence are
legitimate), the second-stage ones will be also legitimate. We output (b′ = b) where
the distinguisher outputs b′. As a result of this game, the challenge messages no
longer depend on b. It is easy to see that according to the IND-CPA challenge bit
this reduction interpolates between games Game1 and Game2.
Game3 : In this game we use C1 in challenge token generation even if b = 0. We show
this hop in unnoticeable down to the security of the obfuscator. We sample an
FE key pair and a symmetric key and simulating the first-stage TGen queries for
the adversary as before. We define a DI sampler that outputs the circuits that the
Res-PRIV sampler outputs, but extends the circuit list to include another copy of
C1 on both sides. This sampler also outputs as auxiliary information z
′ the original
auxiliary information output by the PRIV sampler, extended with the random coins
used to generate the FE key, the symmetric key, and to run the first stage of the
adversary (this will allow the second stage DI adversary to reconstruct the keys
and first stage TGen queries). It follows that this sampler is unpredictable as
long as the Res-PRIV sampler is. When we receive the obfuscations and z′, we
generate (C∗,m∗) ←$ S∗(z,C), where C are all first-phase TGen queries. We
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form the challenge tokens using the received obfuscations and C∗, taking the C1
obfuscations from the duplicated part of the challenge, and the C0 obfuscations
from the original part (these can now be either C0 or C1 depending on the external
challenge bit). Challenge ciphertexts are generated by encrypting m∗ (rules of
Game2). We answer the second-stage TGen queries using the FE key and the
symmetric key. We return whatever the distinguisher returns. It is easy to see that
according to the DI challenge bit this reduction interpolates between games Game2
and Game3.
In Game3 both the challenge tokens and challenge ciphertexts are independent of the bit
b and hence the advantage of any adversary is 0.
Examples. Consider keyword samplers which output high-entropy keywords and mes-
sages with arbitrary image matrices. All such samplers are concentrated around a sampler
S∗ that outputs uniformly random keywords and messages subject to the same image pat-
tern. The second concentration condition is immediate and the first follows from the fact
that all messages and circuits have high entropy and C is selectively chosen. Although
this argument can be extended to samplers outputting low-entropy keywords whose com-
plete image matrix is predictable or is included in z, the latter requirement may not
always be the case in general. Consider, for example, a vector C consisting of circuits
for w = 0n and messages m0 = m1 whose components are randomly set to 0
n and 1n.
The image matrix in this setting is unpredictable as long as a sufficiently large number
of messages are output.
Hyperplane membership circuits C[v](w) return 1 iff 〈v,w〉 = 0 (mod p) for a prime
p. As another example, consider unpredictable samplers of hyperplane membership cir-
cuits that output n vectors vi ∈ Zdp and m messages wi ∈ Zdp where all vector entries have
high entropy. Given the corresponding n ×m image matrix, whenever d(n + m) > nm,
a high-entropy pre-image to the image matrix can be sampled as the system will be un-
derdetermined. Under this condition, the second requirement needed for concentration is
met, and the first condition follows as this pre-image is high entropy and C is selectively
chosen. This observation implies that a DI obfuscator for the hyperplane membership
problem will immediately yield a private functional encryption scheme for the same func-
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tionality under arbitrary correlations via the TOX construction, a problem that was left
open in [BRS13b]. In Section 4.3.2 we gave a direct construction of a DI obfuscator
for hyperplane membership by proving that the obfuscator of Canetti, Rothblum and
Varia [CRV10] is DI secure in the presence of random auxiliary information under a
variant of the DDH assumption in the style of those used in [CRV10, BC14].
6.4 The disjunctively-obfuscate-extract (DOX)
transform
In this section, we present a construction specific to point functions. We were able to re-
move the limitation of the TOX transform that provides security guarantees only against
concentrated samplers, and achieve privacy in the presence of arbitrary correlations be-
tween searched keywords and encrypted messages. Our construction demands less from
the underlying functional encryption and obfuscator, and hence can potentially allow
more efficient instantiations of these primitives.
The DOX transform. Let Obf be an obfuscator supporting a point circuit family CSp
over message space MSp. Let FE be a functional encryption scheme supporting general
circuits, and let PRP be a pseudorandom permutation (see Section 2.3.1 for the formal
definition). We construct a keyword search scheme KS for keyword space WSp = MSp
via the Disjunctively-Obfuscate-Extract (DOX) transform as follows. The key-generation
algorithm samples a PRP key k←$ K(1λ) and an FE key pair (msk,mpk)←$ FE.Gen(1λ).
It returns ((k,msk),mpk). The encryption operation is identical to that of the FE scheme.
The test algorithm is identical to the evaluation algorithm of FE. The token-generation
algorithm computes
FE.TGen(msk,Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[E(k,w)])) .
The FE-extracted circuits are two-point circuits implemented as the disjunction of two
obfuscated point functions. One of the points will correspond to the searched query,
whereas the other point will be pseudorandom and will be only used for proofs of security.
(In a loose sense, the second point represents the second branch in the TOX construction.)
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As in OX, the composable VGB obfuscator of [BC14] for point functions and any general-
purpose functional encryption scheme (such as those in [GKP+13, GGH+13]) can be used
to instantiate the above construction. The supported circuit class would roughly amount
to two parallel group operations and two comparisons in a DDH group.
We show next that DOX is computationally correct. The proof relies on the fact that
correctness remains intact unless the adversary finds one of the hidden PRP values, and
the probability of the latter can be bounded by the one-way security of the obfuscator
and the pseudorandomness of PRP.
Theorem 7 (DOX is computationally correct). Let Obf be an obfuscator and let FE be a
computationally correct FE scheme. Then DOX[FE,PRP,Obf] is computationally correct
if the underlying PRP is pseudorandom and Obf is OW secure. More precisely, for any
adversary A in game CC against DOX[FE,PRP,Obf], placing at most t queries to TGen,
there exist adversaries B1, B2 and B3 such that
AdvccKS,A(λ) ≤ AdvccFE,B3(λ) + (t+ 1) ·AdvowObf,B2(λ) + AdvprpPRP,B1(λ) +
t+ 1
|WSpλ|
.
Proof. The proof is simple and follows two game hops as follows.
Game0 : This is the CC game with respect to FE and PRP.
Game1 : In this game instead of a PRP a truly random permutation (simulated via lazy
sampling) is used in the calculation of tokens in TGen oracle and preparing tp.
Game2 : In this game, if a token generation query or one of A’s output words matches
any of the randomly generated words (via lazy sampling) the game aborts.
The analyses of the game transitions are straightforward. The transition from Game0
to Game1 relies on the security of the PRP. The transition from Game1 to Game2 is down
to the one-way security of the obfuscator (note that the only information leaked to the
adversary about each of the random keywords is via an obfuscated circuit included in
the extracted tokens). Finally, the advantage of the adversary in Game2 can be bounded
down to the correctness of FE. We give the details next.
Game0 to Game1. Any adversary A with visible advantage difference in these two games
can be converted to an adversary B1 against the security of the PRP. Assume that lazy
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sampling is implemented using a table T , i.e., T [w] indicates the random value assigned
to w. Algorithm B1 starts by generating an FE key pair. It handles a queries w of A
to TGen by first computing w′ ← Fn(w) via its Fn oracle, obfuscating the circuits
associated with these keywords, and finally generating a token for the disjunction of the
obfuscated circuits using the master secret key. Token generation after A terminates is
handled similarly, and the remaining operations in of the CC game can be simulated
using mpk. B1 will finally check if A succeeded in breaking correctness. If so, then its
output will be 0. Else, it will be 1.
Note that when the Fn oracle implements the PRP, Game0 is simulated for A, and
when it implements a random permutation Game1 is simulated. A simple probability
analysis yields,
Pr[Game0(1
λ)]− Pr[Game1(1λ)] = AdvprpPRP,B1(λ) .
Game1 to Game2. Let us consider that the game is aborted if, at the end of the execution
of Game2, one considers all keywords explicitly output by the adversary (i.e., all w
∗ in
the list of keywords queried from TGen plus the challenge keyword and message output
by the adversary when it terminates), and for some keyword w in table T we have:
w∗ = T [w] .
We bound the probability that this bad flag is set via the one-way security of the obfus-
cation. We build the required B2 against the (t + 1)-OW security of Obf as follows. B2
first guesses the query i in which A first produces w by choosing an index i ←$ [t + 1],
where t is an upper bound on the number of TGen queries that A makes and the extra
1 accounts for the challenge keyword it produces on termination. B2 then generates an
FE key pair, runs A and answers its TGen queries using the master secret key and con-
structing T [w] as before, except when the i-th query comes (and all future w queries). In
the latter case, B2 uses a new challenge obfuscated circuit it receives in the one-wayness
game. Note that we have implicitly programmed T [w] to be an unknown value, which
leads to an inconsistency with probability at most (t+ 1)/|WSp|: an upper bound on the
probability that this value collides with one of the values in T during the entire game.
When the bad event is detected, and if B2’s guess was correct, then B2 can recognize the
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faulty keyword by checking the obfuscated circuits it received for a match, and it can win
the one-wayness game. Hence,
Pr[Game1(1
λ)]− Pr[Game2(1λ)] ≤ (t+ 1) ·AdvowObf,t,B2(λ) +
t+ 1
|WSpλ|
.
Analysis of Game2. In this game we use A to build an adversary against the compu-
tational correctness of the underlying FE scheme. Note that if Game2 does not abort,
then m 6= T (w) when A terminates. We show that if A wins without any aborts we can
build an adversary B3 which wins the FE correctness game. Algorithm B3 gets mpk and
runs A on it. It answers A’s TGen queries using its own oracle, still lazily sampling T [w]
and asking for a trapdoor on the disjunction of the obfuscated circuits. When A returns
(m,w), algorithm B3 also returns these. Note that this is winning pair iff it is a winning
pair in the FE game. We therefore have
Pr[Game2(1
λ)] = AdvccFE,B3(λ) .
The proof of Res-PRIV security of this construction involves an intricate game hopping
argument, in order to deal with all possible correlations allowed by the Res-PRIV model
(which are the same as those allowed by full PRIV). We outline it below, highlighting
how various ingredients are used in the construction, and provide a detailed proof in
Appendix 8.
Theorem 8 (DOX is Res-PRIV). If FE is an IND-CPA-secure functional encryption
scheme, PRP is a PRP-secure pseudorandom permutation family and Obf is a DI-secure
obfuscator then scheme DOX[FE,PRP,Obf] is a Res-PRIV-secure keyword search scheme.
Outline. The proof proceeds along six games as follows. Roughly speaking, after moving
to a random permutation in Game1 (and some bookkeeping in Game2), in Game3 we move
from correlations between messages and keywords to their repetition patterns. In Game4,
we use obfuscation to deal with repetitions among keywords that do not match any of the
messages (and were not queried to TGen in first phase). In Game5, we use FE security
to remove repetitions among messages that do not match any of the challenge keywords
and were not queried to token-generation either (either due to legitimacy or adversarial
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restriction). Repetitions in all other cases can be dealt with using explicit values, the
image matrix, or obfuscations. These steps make challenge ciphertexts independent of the
challenge bit. In Game6, using the security of the obfuscator we move to a setting where
challenge tokens are also independent of the bit. In Game6 advantage of any adversary
is 0.
Game0 : This game is identical to the Res-PRIV game.
Game1 : Instead of PRP, a truly random permutation is used in TGen. We simulate the
random permutation via a lazily sampled table T . This transition is sound down
to PRP security.
Game2 : We introduce a bad flag. We generate PRP values for all keywords and messages.
If there are two T -values (x1, T (x2)) and (x2, T (x2)) such that x1 = T (x2) we set
bad. By the OW security of the obfuscator, these PRP values remain hidden and
bad can only be set with negligible probability.
Game3 : We compute the ciphertexts by encrypting T (m
∗
b) instead of m
∗
b . This hop
is reduced to the IND-CPA security of the FE, via explicit knowledge of challenge
keywords and message by running the ppt sampler. Legitimacy will be violated if
there is a w queried to TGen such that w = T (mb) or mb = T (w). Both of these
events set bad.
Game4 : Call a challenge keyword unpaired if it was not any of the challenge messages,
and new if it is not queried to first-phase TGen. In this game, instead of T
values we use forgetful random values for all new and unpaired keywords. We
bound this hop using DI. We simulate first-phase TGen using a lazily sampled
T and a msk. Next, we run the Res-PRIV sampler explicitly and identify all new
unpaired keywords. We define a DI sampler to sample consistent values on left
and forgetful values on right (both independently of T ), together with a second set
consisting of sufficiently many consistent values on both sides. (The DI sampler
does not need to respect any equality patterns.) This sampler can be shown to
be statistically unpredictable. Once we receive the obfuscations, we use the first
set, the explicit knowledge of challenge values and table T to form the challenge
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tokens and ciphertexts. For second-phase TGen queries we need to use consistent
T values throughout. For values which match a first-phase query or a challenge
messages we use T . If a query happens to match a new unpaired keywords—we
can check this using the explicit knowledge of the keywords—we use a value from
the second set of obfuscations. Otherwise we sample T values. We return 1 iff the
adversary succeeds.
Game5 : Call a challenge message unpaired if it is not any of the challenge keywords,
LR-identical if m∗0 = m1, LR-differing if not equal, and new if it is unpaired and
not queried to first-phase TGen. In this game instead of T values we use forgetful
values for all unpaired LR-differing messages and all new LR-identical messages.
We bound this hop down to IND-CPA. We will use the provided TGen oracle
and only need to set T -values correctly. For first-phase TGen queries we lazily
sample T . Next we run the sampler explicitly to obtain the challenges. For paired
keywords or messages we use T -consistent values. For new unpaired keywords we
use forgetful values (rule in Game4). For unpaired messages, if LR-identical and
queried to first-phase TGen (hence not new) we also use consistent T values. For
LR-differing or new LR-identical messages we call LR in FE game, asking for T -
consistent values on the left and independent forgetful values on the right. Note that
LR-differing messages and new LR-identical messages are not queried to TGen at
all due to our restriction on the adversary. If a second-phase TGen query matches
a forgetful value generated in computing the LR query, we stop and guess that
forgetful values were encrypted. (These values are information theoretically hidden
if not encrypted.) Otherwise, we return 1 iff the adversary succeeds.
Game6 : In this game, irrespective of the bit, we use the second set of keywords for
challenge token generation. We reduce this transition to the DI game. First-phase
TGen queries are answered using a lazily sampled T and a generated msk. We set
the DI sampler to run the PRIV sampler and on top of the output keywords, also
ask for obfuscations of messages that are at the same time LR-identical, unpaired
and new (it also outputs the random coins of first stage adversary, key generation
and token extraction, along with a full image matrix as extra auxiliary information
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that will be needed for the second stage simulation). Using the symmetry of roles
for keywords and messages in point functions, this sampler can be shown to be
unpredictable whenever the PRIV sampler is. The obfuscations of messages will
allow us to check if any of these messages (hidden under the obfuscation) match a
first-phase TGen query. We need this as according to the rules of Game5 we must
use T -consistent values. For paired messages, which we can find using the image
matrix, we also use T -consistent values. For unpaired keywords we use forgetful
values. For all other unpaired messages (be it LR-differing or never queried to
TGen) we use forgetful values (Game5). Second phase TGen queries are answered
using T -consistent values relying on the fact that we can use the obfuscations to
check matches with paired keywords and the restriction that adversary cannot query
a new unpaired LR-identical messages to TGen. We return 1 iff the adversary
succeeds.
Challenge tokens in Game6 are independent of the challenge bit. Due to the modi-
fications in Game4 and Game5, the challenge ciphertexts are also independent of it. To
see this note that ciphertexts contain on left and right: (1) identical T -consistent values
that follow the correct repetition pattern for paired massages; (2) forgetful (independent)
values for LR-differing messages; (3) identical T -consistent values that follow the correct
repetition pattern for LR-identical messages queried in the first stage; (4) forgetful (inde-
pendent) values for LR-identical messages not queried in the first stage. The adversary,
therefore, has zero advantage in this game.
6.5 The verifiably-obfuscate-encrypt-extract
(VOEX) transform
We now present a fifth construction for point functions, which although simpler, con-
ceptually relies on the observation that messages can be encoded as circuits that other
circuits can evaluate. The obfuscator that we will rely on in our construction needs to
be verifiable, meaning that there is an efficient algorithm to determine if a circuit C is an
obfuscation of a point function C[m] for a message m ∈ MSpλ. This property can be easily
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added by attaching a NIZK proof that there exist (m, r) such that C = Obf(1λ,C[m]; r).
The VOEX transform. Let NIZK = (NIZK.Setup,NIZK.Prove,NIZK.Verify) be a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof system (see Section 2.3.4). Let Obf be an obfuscator
supporting a circuit family CSp := {CSp1λ∪CSp2λ}λ∈N, where CSp1λ := {C[m] : m ∈ MSpλ}
and CSp2λ := {D[crs,m] : m ∈ MSpλ, crs ∈ [NIZK.Setup(1λ)]} with
D[crs,w](C, pi) :=
1 if NIZK.Verify(crs,C, pi) ∧ C(w) = 1 ;0 otherwise.
Let RSp := {RSpλ}λ∈N denote the randomness space of Obf. Let FE be a functional
encryption scheme supporting general circuits. We construct a keyword search scheme
KS := VOEX[FE,NIZK,Obf] via the Verifiably-Obfuscate-Encrypt-Extract (VOEX) trans-
form for keyword space WSp := MSp as follows.
Setup: Algorithm KS.Gen(1λ) generates a functional encryption key pair (msk,mpk)←$
FE.Gen(1λ) and a common reference string crs ←$ NIZK.Setup(1λ). It returns the
key pair ((msk, crs), (mpk, crs)).
Encryption: Algorithm KS.Enc((mpk, crs),m) generates C ←$ Obf(1λ,C[m]; r) for r ←$
RSpλ. It sets pi←$ NIZK.Prove(crs,C, (m, r)) and finally returns FE.Enc(mpk, (C, pi)).
Token generation: Algorithm KS.TGen((msk, crs),w) generates a token for the circuit
D[crs,w] using the token-extraction algorithm FE.TGen and returns the result.
Evaluation: Algorithm KS.Test(c, tk) simply runs FE.Eval(c, tk).
Correctness of the construction follows from the correctness of the obfuscator and
that of the functional encryption scheme, as well as the completeness of the proof system.
Before presenting the theorem, we clarify the requirements on the underlying obfuscation
scheme.
PRIV-restricted samplers. As shown in the work of Barak et al. [BGI+01], no 2-
circuits general-purpose VBB obfuscator exists. This impossibility result can be extended
to rule out general-purpose DI obfuscation as well and, in particular, DI obfuscation
supporting the class of circuits we require for instantiating our construction above. Briefly,
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consider the circuits D[w](C) := C(w) and a sampler S that outputs circuits (D[w],C[w])
on the left and (D[w],C[w]) on the right for a uniform keyword w. This sampler can
be shown to be unpredictable. However, the DI game can be won by evaluating (an
obfuscation of) the first challenge circuit on an obfuscation of the second challenge circuit.
For our particular construction, however, we rely on a weaker form of obfuscation that
is only required to support samplers that output circuits and messages that are restricted
by the PRIV legitimacy condition (this is a result of our reduction strategy). Concretely,
such circuits and messages will result on image matrices that are identical on the left and
right, which completely rules out attacks akin to those in [BGI+01]. We call this class
of DI samplers PRIV-restricted. Formally, a DI sampler S is PRIV-restricted for circuit
class CSp if for a legitimate PRIV sampler S ′ and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
system NIZK it operates as follows.
S(1λ, st, crs) : (w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S ′(1λ, st);
if crs /∈ [NIZK.Setup(1λ)] return ([], [], )
else return ((D[crs,w0],C[m0]), (D[crs,w1],C[m1]), (z,C[w0](m0)))
The PRIV security of the VOEX construction is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 (VOEX is PRIV secure). If FE is IND-CPA secure, NIZK is perfectly sound
and computationally zero-knowledge, and obfuscator Obf is DI secure with respect to
PRIV-restricted samplers, then scheme VOEX[FE,Obf,NIZK] is PRIV secure.
Proof (Outline). The proof follows a sequence of three game hops.
Game0 : This is the PRIV game for the VOEX construction.
Game1 : We say a message mb[i] is unpaired if mb[i] /∈ wb. Note that for all legitimate
samplers if m0[i] is unpaired, so is m1[i]. In this game, the LR oracle replaces all un-
paired messages (on both sides) which are LR-differing (that is, when m0[i] 6= m0[i])
with random and independently sampled values. The distance to the previous game
can be upper bounded using the IND-CPA security of the FE scheme. The legiti-
macy of the algorithm playing the IND-CPA game in the reduction is guaranteed
because: (1) replaced messages are LR-differing and therefore the adversary cannot
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ask tokens for those in the PRIV game (and hence also the IND-CPA hame); (2)
replacements are random and information-theoretically hidden from the adversary
when the original messages are encrypted, and if the adversary asks for token for
one of the random replacements, it can be only because the ciphertexts are leaking
one of these replacements.
Game2 : In this game we use Sim to generate simulated proofs in the LR oracle without
using the explicit knowledge of the messages. The distance to the previous game
can be bounded by the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof system.
Game3 : In this game, regardless of bit b, we use the second set of keywords and messages
to generate the challenge. We reduce this transition to the DI game. We set the
DI sampler to take a crs along with the state st required to run the PRIV sampler;
it runs the PRIV sampler to obtain keywords and messages, and it outputs a D
circuit (with a hardwired crs) for every keyword and a C circuit for every message
(after carefully replacing LR-differing unpaired messages with random values as in
Game1). This DI sampler is by definition PRIV-restricted and it is unpredictable
whenever the underlying PRIV sampler is unpredictable. The proof of this fact
relies on the perfect soundness of the proof system under the binding crs, whose
validity we assume can be efficiently checked [GS08]. The PRIV predictor uses
its oracle to answer the DI predictor’s queries (if a query contains an obfuscated
point circuit and the attached proof verifies, the unbounded PRIV predictor can
reverse-engineer the obfuscated circuit to recover its underlying point, and query its
own oracle on it). The adversary against the DI game simulates the environment
of Game2 as follows. It generates a key pair (msk,mpk) and simulated (crs, tp) for
the NIZK, and then it runs the first stage of the PRIV adversary until it obtains
state st for the LR oracle call. It then calls its own LR oracle on (st, crs), obtaining
a set of obfuscations. As before, the trapdoor tp is used to produce simulated
proofs of the obfuscations of C circuits corresponding to messages, resulting in well-
formed challenge ciphertexts. It then runs the second stage of the PRIV adversary,
answering its token extraction queries using the master secret key and, when this
adversary returns a bit b′, it uses it as its own guess.
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In Game3, the challenge is independent of bit b and therefore the adversary has zero
advantage.
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Chapter 7
Updatable Functional Encryption
The results described in this section have been published in [AIT16].
The concept of functional encryption (FE), a generalization of identity-based encryp-
tion, attribute-based encryption, inner-product encryption and other forms of public-key
encryption, was independently formalized by Boneh, Sahai and Waters [BSW11] and
O’Neil [O’N10]. In 2013, Garg et al. [GGH+13] put forth the first candidate construc-
tion of an FE scheme supporting all polynomial-size circuits based on indistinguishability
obfuscation (iO), which is now known as a central hub for the realization of many cryp-
tographic primitives [SW14].
The most common approach is to model functions as circuits. In some works, however,
functions are modeled as Turing machines (TM) or random-access machines (RAM). Re-
cently, Ananth and Sahai [AS16] constructed an adaptively secure functional encryption
scheme for TM, based on indistinguishability obfuscation. Nonetheless, their work does
not tackle the problem of having the token update the encrypted message, over which
other tokens can be subsequently executed.
In the symmetric setting, the notion of garbled RAM, introduced by Lu and Ostro-
vsky [LO13] and revisited by Gentry et al. [GHL+14], addresses this important use-
case where garbled memory data can be reused across multiple program executions.
Garbled RAM can be seen as an analogue of Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao86] (see also
[BHR12] for an abstract generalization) that allows a user to garble a RAM program
without having to compile it into a circuit first. As a result, the time it takes to eval-
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uate a garbled program is only proportional to the running time of the program on
a random-access machine. Several other candidate constructions were also proposed
in [GHRW14, CHJV14, CHJV15, CH16].
Desmedt et al. [DIPV14] proposed an FE with controlled homomorphic properties.
However, their scheme updates and re-encrypts the entire data, which carries a highly
inefficient evaluation-time.
Our contribution. In this chapter, we propose a new primitive that we call updat-
able functional encryption (UFE). It bears resemblance to functional encryption in that
encryption is carried out in the public-key setting and the owner of the master secret
key can issue tokens for functions—here, modeled as RAM programs—of its choice that
allow learning the outcome of the function on the message underneath a ciphertext. We
envision tokens that are also capable to update the ciphertext, over which other tokens
can be subsequently executed. We impose strict efficiency constrains in that the run-time
of a token P on ciphertext CT is proportional to the run-time of its clear-form counterpart
(program P on memory D) up to a polylogarithmic factor in the size of D. We define a se-
curity notion for our primitive and propose a candidate construction based on an instance
of distributional indistinguishability (DI) obfuscation. Recent results put differing-inputs
obfuscation (diO) [ABG+13] with auxiliary information in contention with other assump-
tions [BST16]; one might question if similar attacks apply to the obfuscation notion we
require in our reduction. As far as we can tell, the answer is negative. However, we view
our construction as a starting point towards the realization of other updatable functional
encryption schemes from milder forms of obfuscation.
7.1 RAM programs
In the RAM model of computation, a program P has random-access to some initial
memory data D, comprised of |D| memory cells. At each CPU step of its execution,
P reads from and writes to a single memory cell address, which is determined by the
previous step, and updates its internal state. By convention, the address in the first
step is set to the first memory cell of D, and the initial internal state is empty. Only
when P reaches the final step of its execution, it outputs a result y and terminates. We
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use the notation y ← PD→D? to indicate this process, where D? is the resulting memory
data when P terminates, or simply y ← PD if we don’t care about the resulting memory
data. We also consider the case where the memory data persists between a sequential
execution of n programs, and use the notation (y1, ..., yn)← (P1, ...,Pn)D→D? as short for
(y1 ← PD→D11 ; ... ; yn ← PDn−1→D?n ). In more detail, a RAM program description is a
4-tuple P := (Q, T ,OSp, δ), where:
• Q is the set of all possible states, which always includes the empty state .
• T is the set of all possible contents of a memory cell. If each cell contains a single
bit, T = {0, 1}.
• OSp is the output space of P, which always includes the empty output .
• δ is the transition function, modeled as a circuit, which maps (Q × T ) to (T ×
Q× N× OSp). On input an internal state sti ∈ Q and a content of a memory cell
readi ∈ T , it outputs a (possibly different) content of a memory cell writei ∈ T , an
internal state sti+1 ∈ Q, an address of a memory cell addri+1 ∈ N and an output
y ∈ OSp.
In Figure 7.1 we show how program P is executed on a random-access machine with initial
memory data D.
To conveniently specify the efficiency and security properties of the primitive we
propose in the following section, we define functions runTime and accessPattern that on
input a program P and some initial memory data D return the number of steps required for
P to complete its execution on D and the list of addresses accessed during the execution,
respectively. In other words, as per description in Figure 7.1, runTime returns the value i
when P terminates, whereas accessPattern returns List. More generally, we also allow these
functions to receive as input a set of programs (P1, ...,Pn) to be executed sequentially on
persistent memory, initially set to D.
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Execute PD:
i← 0; addri ← 0; sti ← ; y← ; List← []
while (y = )
// step i
List← addri : List // record the access pattern
readi ← D[addri] // read from memory
(writei, sti+1, addri+1, y)← δ(sti, readi)
D[addri]← writei // write to memory
i← i+ 1
return (y)
Figure 7.1: Execution process of a program P on a RAM machine with memory D.
7.2 Definitions
We propose a new primitive that we call updatable functional encryption. It bears re-
semblance to functional encryption in that encryption is carried out in the public-key
setting and the owner of the master secret key can issue tokens for functions of its choice
that allows the holder of the token to learn the outcome of the function on the message
underneath a ciphertext. Here, we model functions as RAM programs instead of circuits,
which is closer to how programs are expressed in von Neumann architecture and avoids
the RAM-to-circuit compilation. Not only that, we envision tokens that are capable to
update the ciphertext, over which other tokens can be subsequently executed. Because
the ciphertext evolves every time a token is executed and for better control over what
information is revealed, each token is numbered sequentially so that it can only be exe-
cuted once and after all previous extracted tokens have been executed on that ciphertext.
Informally, the security requires that the ciphertext should not reveal more than what can
be learned by applying the extracted tokens in order. As for efficiency, we want the run-
time of a token to be proportional to the run-time of the program up to a polylogarithmic
factor in the length of the encrypted message.
Syntax. An updatable functional encryption scheme UFE for program family P :=
{Pλ}λ∈N with message space MSp := {MSpλ}λ∈N is specified by three ppt algorithms as
follows.
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• UFE.Setup(1λ) is the setup algorithm and on input a security parameter 1λ it out-
puts a master secret key msk and a master public key mpk;
• UFE.TokenGen(msk,P, tid) is the token-generation algorithm and on input a master
secret key msk, a program description P ∈ Pλ and a token-id tid ∈ N, outputs a
token (i.e. another program description) Ptid;
• UFE.Enc(mpk,D) is the encryption algorithm and on input a master public key mpk
and memory data D ∈ MSpλ outputs a ciphertext CT.
We do not explicitly consider an evaluation algorithm. Instead, the RAM program P
output by UFE.TokenGen executes directly on memory data CT, a ciphertext resulting
from the UFE.Enc algorithm. Note that this brings us close to the syntax of Garbled
RAM, but in contrast encryption is carried out in the public-key setting.
Correctness. We say that UFE is correct if for every security parameter λ ∈ N,
for every memory data D ∈ MSpλ and for every sequence of polynomial length in λ of
programs (P1, ...,Pn), it holds that
Pr

y1 = y
′
1 ∧ ... ∧ yn = y′n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(msk,mpk) ←$ UFE.Setup(1λ)
CT ←$ UFE.Enc(mpk,D)
for i ∈ [n]
Pi ←$ UFE.TokenGen(msk,Pi, i)
(y1, ..., yn)← (P1, ...,Pn)D
(y′1, ..., y
′
n)← (P1, ...,Pn)CT

= 1.
Efficiency. Besides the obvious requirement that all algorithms run in polynomial-time
in the length of their inputs, we also require that the run-time of token P on ciphertext
CT is proportional to the run-time of its clear-form counterpart (program P on memory
D) up to a polynomial factor in λ and up to a polylogarithmic factor in the length of
D. More precisely, we require that for every λ ∈ N, for every sequence of polynomial
length in λ of programs (P1, ...,Pn) and every memory data D ∈ MSpλ, there exists a
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fixed polynomial function poly and a fixed polylogarithmic function polylog such that
Pr

runTime((P1, ...,Pn),CT) ≤
runTime((P1, ...,Pn),D)·
poly(λ) · polylog(|D|)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(msk,mpk) ←$ UFE.Setup(1λ)
CT ←$ UFE.Enc(mpk,D)
for i ∈ [n]
Pi ←$ UFE.TokenGen(msk,Pi)
 = 1.
In particular, this means that for a program P running in sublinear-time in |D|, the
run-time of P over the encrypted data remains sublinear.
Security. Let UFE be an updatable functional encryption scheme. We say UFE is
selectively secure if for any legitimate ppt adversary A
AdvselUFE,A(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
SELAUFE(1
λ)
]− 1 ∈ Negl,
where game SELAUFE(1
λ) is defined in Figure 7.2. We say A is legitimate if the following
two conditions are satisfied:
1. (P1, ...,Pn)
D0 = (P1, ...,Pn)
D1
2. accessPattern((P1, ...,Pn),D0) = accessPattern((P1, ...,Pn),D1)
These conditions avoid that the adversary trivially wins the game by requesting tokens
whose output differ on left and right challenge messages or have different access patterns.
SELAUFE(1
λ):
(D0,D1, (P1, ...,Pn), st) ←$ A0(1λ)
(msk,mpk) ←$ UFE.Setup(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
CT ←$ UFE.Enc(mpk,Db)
for i ∈ [n]
Pi ←$ UFE.TokenGen(msk,Pi)
b′ ←$ A1(CT, (P1, ...,Pn), st)
return (b = b′)
Figure 7.2: Selective security of an updatable functional encryption scheme UFE.
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7.3 Candidate construction
The idea of our construction is the following. Before encryption we append to the cleartext
the token-id of the first token to be issued, the address of the first position to be read
and the initial state of the program. These values are all pre-defined at the beginning.
We then split the data into bits and label each of them with a common random tag, their
position on the array and a counter that keeps track of how many times that bit was
updated (initially 0). Then, we build a Merkle tree over the labeled bits. Later, this will
allow us to check the consistency of the data without having to read through all of it. It
also binds a token-id, a read-position and a state to the data at a particular stage. Finally,
we encrypt each node of the tree, twice, and attach a NIZK proof attesting that they
encrypt the same content. Tokens include the decryption key inside their transition circuit
in order to perform the computation over the clear data and re-encrypt the nodes at the
end of each CPU step. These circuits are obfuscated to protect the decryption key, and
the random coins necessary to re-encrypt come from a puncturable PRF. The proof then
follows a mix of different strategies seen in [NY90, IPS15, GGH+13, ABF16, GJKS15].
• UFE.Setup(1λ) samples public-key encryption key pairs (sk0, pk0)←$ PKE.Setup(1λ)
and (sk1, pk1)←$ PKE.Setup(1λ), a common reference string crs←$ NIZK.Setup(1λ)
and a collision-resistant hash function H ←$ Hλ. It then sets constants (l1, l2, l3)
as the maximum length of token-ids, addresses and possible states induced by
the supported program set Pλ, respectively, encoded as bit-strings. Finally, it
sets msk ← sk0 and mpk ← (pk0, pk1, crs,H, (l1, l2, l3)) and outputs the key pair
(msk,mpk).
• UFE.Enc(mpk,D) parses mpk as (pk0, pk1, crs,H, (l1, l2, l3)) and appends to the mem-
ory data D the token-id 1, address 0 and the empty state , encoded as bit-stings
of length l1, l2 and l3, respectively: D ← (D, 1, 0, ). (We assume from now on
that |D| is a power of 2. This is without loss of generality since D can be padded.)
UFE.Enc sets z← log(|D|), samples a random string tag ←$ {0, 1}λ and constructs
a perfectly balanced binary tree T := {node(i,j)}, where leafs are set as
∀j ∈ {0, ..., (|D| − 1)}, node(z,j) ← (D[j], tag, (z, j), 0)
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and intermediate nodes are computed as
∀i ∈ {(z− 1), ..., 0}, ∀j ∈ {0, ..., (2i − 1)},
node(i,j) ← (H(node(i+1,2j), node(i+1,2j+1))).
UFE.Enc then encrypts each node independently under pk0 and pk1, i.e.
∀i ∈ {0, ..., z}, ∀j ∈ {0, ..., (2i − 1)},
r
(i,j)
0 ←$ RSpλ ; r(i,j)1 ←$ RSpλ
CT
(i,j)
0 ← PKE.Enc(pk0, node(i,j); r(i,j)0 )
CT
(i,j)
1 ← PKE.Enc(pk1, node(i,j); r(i,j)1 )
and computes NIZK proofs that CT
(i,j)
0 and CT
(i,j)
1 encrypt the same content. More
precisely,
∀i ∈ {0, ..., z}, ∀j ∈ {0, ..., (2i − 1)},
pi(i,j) ←$ NIZK.Prove(crs, x(i,j), (node(i,j), r(i,j)0 , r(i,j)1 )),
where x(i,j) is the NP statement
∃(m, r0, r1) : CT(i,j)0 = PKE.Enc(pk0,m; r0) ∧ CT(i,j)1 = PKE.Enc(pk1,m; r1).
Finally, UFE.Enc lets
CT := {(CT(i,j)0 ,CT(i,j)1 , pi(i,j))},
which encodes a perfectly balanced tree, and outputs it as a ciphertext of memory
data D under mpk.
• UFE.TokenGen(msk,mpk,P, tid) parses (pk0, pk1, crs,H, (l1, l2, l3))← mpk, sk0 ← msk
and (Q, T ,OSp, δ)← P. Then, a new puncturable PRF key k ←$ PPRF.Gen(1λ) is
sampled. Next, it sets a circuit δ̂ as described in Figure 7.3, using the parsed values
as the appropriate hardcoded constants with the same naming. UFE.TokenGen then
obfuscates this circuit by computing δ ←$ Obf(δ̂). Finally, for simplicity in order
to avoid having to explicitly deal with the data structure in the ciphertext, and
following a similar approach as in [CCHR15], we define token P not by its transi-
tion function, but by pseudocode, as the RAM program that executes on CT the
following:
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1. Set initial state st← , initial address addr← 0 and empty output y← .
2. While (y = )
(a) Construct a tree T by selecting from CT the leaf at address addr and the
last (l1 + l2 + l3) leafs (that should encode tid, addr and st if CT is valid),
as well as all the necessary nodes to compute the hash values of their path
up to the root.
(b) Evaluate (T, addr, y)← δ(T).
(c) Update CT by writing the resulting T to it.
3. Output y.
Theorem 10. Let PKE be an IND-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme, let NIZK be
a non-interactive zero knowledge proof system with perfect completeness, computational
zero knowledge and statistical soundness, let H be a collision-resistant hash function fam-
ily, let PPRF be a puncturable pseudorandom function and let Obf be an iO-secure obfus-
cator that is also DI-secure w.r.t. the class of samplers described in Game4. Then, the
updatable functional encryption scheme UFE[PKE,NIZK,H,PPRF,Obf] detailed in Sec-
tion 7.3 is selectively secure (as per definition in Figure 7.2).
Proof (Outline). The proof proceeds via a sequence of games as follows.
Game0 : This game is identical to the real SEL game when the challenge bit b = 0, i.e.
the challenger encrypts D0 in the challenge ciphertext.
Game1 : In this game, the common reference string and NIZK proofs are simulated. More
precisely, at the beginning of the game, the challenger executes (crs, tp)←$ Sim0(1λ)
to produce the crs that is included in the mpk, and proofs in the challenge ciphertext
are computed with Sim1 and tp. The distance to the previous game can be bounded
by the zero-knowledge property of NIZK.
Game2 : Let T0 := {node(i,j)0 } be the perfectly balanced tree resulting from the encoding
of D0 with tag0, and T1 := {node(i,j)1 } the one resulting from the encoding of D1
with tag1, where (D0,D1) are the challenge messages queried by the adversary and
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Hardcoded: Transition circuit δ, token-id tid∗, secret key sk0, puncturable PRF key k, public keys pk0 and pk1,
common reference string crs, hash function H and bit-length constants (l1, l2, l3).
Input: Tree T.
Execute these 7 steps:
1. Verify the NIZK proof in each node of tree T, and decrypt the first ciphertext of each node with sk0. Let
T be the resulting decrypted tree.
∀(i, j) ∈ N2 : node(i,j) ∈ T,
parse node
(i,j)
as (CT
(i,j)
0 ,CT
(i,j)
1 , pi
(i,j)) or return ⊥
if NIZK.Verify(crs, x(i,j), pi(i,j)) = false return ⊥
node(i,j) ← PKE.Dec(sk0,CT(i,j)0 )
let T := {node(i,j)}
2. On the decrypted tree T, verify the path of each leaf up to the root (i.e. intermediate nodes must be
equal to the hash of their children) and check that all leafs are marked with the same random tag.
z← max{i ∈ N : node(i,j) ∈ T, ∃j ∈ N}
∀j ∈ N : node(z,j) ∈ T,
∀i ∈ {(z− 1), ..., 0}
if node
(i,b j
2(z−i)
c) 6= H(node((i+1),2b
j
2(z−i)
c)
, node
((i+1),(2b j
2(z−i)
c+1))
) return ⊥
parse node(z,j) as (value(z,j), tag(z,j), position(z,j), counter(z,j)) or return ⊥
if ∃(j, j′) ∈ N2 : node(z,j) ∈ T ∧ node(z,j′) ∈ T ∧ tag(z,j) 6= tag(z,j′) return ⊥
3. Read the token-id, address and state of the current step encoded in tree T. Check that the token-id
matches the one hardcoded in this token. Then, evaluate the transition circuit δ.
read (tid, addr, st) with fixed bit-length (l1, l2, l3) from T or return ⊥
if tid 6= tid∗ return ⊥
(value(z,addr), st, addr, y)← δ(st, value(z,addr))
4. If the transition circuit δ outputs some result y then increase the token-id and reset the internal state and
address.
if y 6=  then tid← tid + 1 ; st← 0 ; addr← 0
5. Write the (possibly new) token-id, address and state to tree T, update the counters of leaf nodes and
recompute the path of each leaf up to the root.
write (tid, addr, st) with fixed bit-length (l1, l2, l3) to T
∀j ∈ N : node(z,j) ∈ T,
counter(z,j) ← counter(z,j) + 1
∀j ∈ N : node(z,j) ∈ T,
∀i ∈ {(z− 1), ..., 0}
node
(i,b j
2(z−i)
c) ← H(node((i+1),2b
j
2(z−i)
c)
, node
((i+1),(2b j
2(z−i)
c+1))
)
6. Re-encrypt all nodes of T (as before, encrypt under pk0 and pk1 and add NIZK proofs under crs). To
extract the necessary random coins, we use the puncturable PRF under key k, providing as input the
input of this circuit, i.e. T.
∀(i, j) ∈ N2 : node(i,j) ∈ T,
(r
(i,j)
0 , r
(i,j)
1 , r
(i,j)
pi )← PPRF.Eval(k, (T, (i, j)))
∀(i, j) ∈ N2 : node(i,j) ∈ T,
CT
(i,j)
0 ← PKE.Enc(pk0, node(i,j); r(i,j)0 )
CT
(i,j)
1 ← PKE.Enc(pk1, node(i,j); r(i,j)1 )
pi(i,j) ← NIZK.Prove(crs, x(i,j), (node(i,j), r(i,j)0 , r(i,j)1 ); r(i,j)pi )
7. Finally, output the updated (encrypted) tree T, the address for next iteration and possibly the outcome
of the token.
return (T, addr, y)
Figure 7.3: Specification of circuit δ̂, as part of our updatable functional encryption
scheme.
(tag0, tag1) are independently sampled random tags. In this game, CT
(i,j)
1 in the
challenge ciphertext encrypts node
(i,j)
1 ; the NIZK proofs are still simulated. This
transition is negligible down to the IND-CPA security of PKE.
Game3 : In this game we hardwire a pre-computed lookup table to each circuit δ̂l, con-
taining fixed inputs/outputs that allow to bypass the steps described in Figure 7.3.
If the input to the circuit is on the lookup table, it will immediately return the cor-
responding output. The lookup tables are computed such that executing the tokens
in sequence starting on the challenge ciphertext will propagate the execution over
D0 in the left branch and D1 in the right branch. Because the challenge ciphertext
evolves over time as tokens are executed, to argue this game hop we must proceed
by hardwiring one input/output at the time, as follows: (1) We hardwire the in-
put/output of the regular execution [iO property of Obf]; (2) we puncture the PPRF
key of δ̂l on the new hardwired input [functionality preservation under puncturing
of PPRF + iO property of Obf]; (3) we replace the pseudorandom coins used to
produce the hardwired output with real random coins [pseudorandomness at punc-
tured points of PPRF]; (4) we use simulated NIZK proofs in the new hardwired
output [zero-knowledge property of NIZK]; (5) we compute circuit δl independently
on the right branch before encrypting the hardwired output [IND-CPA security of
PKE].
Game4 : In all circuits δ̂l, we switch the decryption key sk0 with sk1 and perform
the operations based on the right branch, i.e. we modify the circuits such that
node(i,j) ← PKE.Dec(sk1,CT(i,j)1 ). This hop can be upper-bounded by the distribu-
tional indistinguishability of Obf. To show this, we construct an adversary (S,B)
against the DI game that runs adversary A as follows.
Sampler S runs A0 to get the challenge messages (D0,D1) and circuits δl. Then,
it produces the challenge ciphertext (same rules apply on Game3 and Game4), and
compute circuits δ̂l according to rules of Game3 (with decryption key sk0) on one
hand and according to rules of Game4 (with decryption key sk1) on the other. Fi-
nally, it outputs the two vectors of circuits and the challenge ciphertext as auxiliary
information.
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Adversary B receives the obfuscated circuits δl either containing sk0 or sk1 and the
challenge ciphertext. With those, it runs adversary A1 perfectly simulating Game3
or Game4. B outputs whatever A1 outputs.
It remains to show that sampler S is computationally unpredictable. Suppose there
is a predictor Pred that finds a differing input for the circuits output by sampler
S. It must be because either the output contains a NIZK proof for a false state-
ment (which contradicts the soundness property of NIZK), or there is a collision in
the Merkle tree (which contradicts the collision-resistance of H), or the predictor
was able to guess the random tag in one of the ciphertexts (which contradicts the
IND-CCA security of PKE). Note that (1) the random tag is high-entropy, so lucky
guesses can be discarded; (2) we cannot rely only on IND-CPA security of PKE
because we need the decryption oracle to check which random tag the predictor
was able to guess to win the indistinguishability game against PKE. We also rely
on the fact that adversary A0 is legitimate in its own game, so the outputs in clear
of the tokens are the same in Game3 and Game4.
Game5 : In this game, we remove the lookup tables introduced in Game3. We remove
one input/output at the time, from the last input/output pair added to the first,
following the reverse strategy of that introduced in Game3.
Game6 : Here, the challenge ciphertext is computed exclusively from D1 (with the same
random tag on both branches). This transition is negligible down to the IND-CPA
security of PKE.
Game7 : In this game, we move back to regular (non-simulated) NIZK proofs in the
challenge ciphertext. The distance to the previous game can be bounded by the
zero-knowledge property of NIZK.
Game8 : We now switch back the decryption key to sk0 and perform the decryption
operation on the left branch. Since NIZK is statistically sound, the circuits are
functionally equivalent. We move from sk1 to sk0 one token at the time. This
transition is down to the iO property of Obf. This game is identical to the real SEL
game when the challenge bit b = 1, which concludes our proof.
91
It is easy to check that the proposed scheme meets the correctness and efficiency properties
as we defined in Section 7.2 for our primitive. The size of the ciphertext is proportional
to the size of the cleartext. The size expansion of the token is however proportional to
the number of steps of its execution, as the circuit δ must be appropriately padded for
the security proof.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Open Problems
Function privacy is limited to what cannot be learned through trivial function evaluation.
In this thesis we propose a precise definition of private functional encryption that models
not only the privacy of encrypted messages but also that of (possibly) correlated tokens.
Compared to previous definitions, ours is more general in that it can be used to model
any function class through our unpredictability framework, capturing a strong degree
of security in real world usage of functional encryption schemes, without the caveat of
having a definition that is so strong that we stumble into the known impossibility results.
Several constructions achieving various degrees of security depending on the expres-
siveness of the supported function class and on the underlying assumptions have been
proposed, including a concrete construction of an IBE scheme from groups of composite
order. We leave, however, some open problems for future work, namely the construction
of functional encryption schemes that achieve full PRIV security from simple forms of
obfuscation or are more efficient under restricted versions of the PRIV model.
For general circuits, a possible path towards a solution to this open problem would be
to consider the FE construction of Garg et al. [GGH+13]. There, a token for a circuit C
is (roughly speaking) an indistinguishability obfuscation of the circuit C(PKE.Dec(sk, ·)).
A natural question is whether this construction already achieves some form of privacy
under the conjecture that the indistinguishability obfuscator achieves VGB obfusca-
tion [BCKP14, Section 1.1]. For specific classes, one can follow the various constructions
presented here and explore variations and optimizations of their underlying primitives.
Indeed, since Res-PRIV constitutes a very mild weakening of PRIV, it could be that a
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modification of it allows the proof of security to be extended to the PRIV model.
Alternatively, a different direction would be to try to instantiate our DOX construc-
tion, which offers very strong privacy guarantees for the keyword search functionality,
with an efficient FE scheme supporting the necessary function class. Currently we only
know how to instantiate such construction from general-purpose FE schemes, such that
in [GGH+13, Wat15, GGHZ14]. However, since we only require one exponentiation and
one equality test, more efficient FE schemes for this particular functionality are likely to
exist.
We also proposed the notion of updatable functional encryption, a new primitive that
models functions as RAM programs, instead of circuits, and allows memory to be persis-
tent across the execution of different programs. The problem at hand showed up to be
quite challenging to realize, even when taking strong cryptographic primitives as build-
ing blocks. Still, one might wish to strengthen the proposed security model by allowing
the adversary to obtain tokens adaptively, or by relaxing the legitimacy condition that
imposes equal access patterns of extracted programs on left and right challenge messages
using known results on Oblivious RAM. In this regard, we view our construction as a
starting point towards the realization of other updatable functional encryption schemes.
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Appendix A
Detailed Security Proof of DOX
Transform
Theorem 1 (Res-PRIV security of DOX). If FE is an IND-CPA secure functional en-
cryption scheme, PRP is pseudorandom and Obf is a DI-secure obfuscator then scheme
DOX[FE,PRP,Obf] is Res-PRIV secure. More precisely, for any adversary (S,A) in
game Res-PRIV against scheme DOX[FE,PRP,Obf], in which A places at most q queries
to TGen oracle and S outputs a tuple (w0,w1,m0,m1, z) such that |w0| = |w1| = t and
|m0| = |m1| = s, there exists adversaries B1, B2, B3, (S4,B4), B5, (S6,B6) such that
Advres-privDOX,S,A(λ) ≤ 2 ·AdvprpPRP,B1(λ) + 2 · (t+ s+ q) ·AdvowObf,B2(λ) +
2 ·Advind-cpaFE,B3 (λ) + 2 ·AdvdiObf,S4,B4(λ) + 2 · (Advind-cpaFE,B5 (λ) +
s · q
|WSpλ|
) + AdvdiObf,S6,B6(λ) .
Proof. The proof follows from a sequence of six game hops. We refer the reader to Fig-
ure A.4 and Figure A.5 for a formal description of each game in a code-based language.
Since the definition of Res-PRIV composes for stateless samplers, we assume A calls LR
oracle exactly once.
Game0 : This game is identical to the Res-PRIV game.
Game1 : Instead of a PRP, a truly random permutation (simulated via lazy sampling) is
used in token generation. The table used to maintain the lazy sampling, which we
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denote by T , has at most (t+ q) entries. The distance to the previous game can be
bounded using the security of the PRP.
Game2 : When sampler S outputs, we generate PRP values of all messages in mb as
well. Since Game1, these are now simulated via lazy sampling, which causes the
expansion of table T to at most (t + s + q) entries. All keywords and messages
whose PRP value was generated are registered in list. Before setting the outcome of
the game, if there are values w1 and w2 in list such that w1 = T [w2], game aborts.
Throughout the game T [w] is obfuscated, so the distance to the previous game can
be upper bounded by the one-wayness property of the obfuscator.
Game3 : LR oracle computes the vector of ciphertexts c by encrypting T [mb] instead of
mb. The distance to the previous game can be upper bounded using the IND-CPA
security property of the underlying FE scheme.
Game4 : We say a keyword w is unpaired if w ∈ wb and w /∈mb. All first-phase queries to
TGen oracle are recorded in FirstPhase list, i.e. all keywords A queries to TGen
oracle before calling LR. During the simulation of LR oracle and second-phase
TGen oracle, if w is an unpaired keyword not in FirstPhase list, we extract its
token from circuit (Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[r])), where r is a fresh random value
uniformly sampled from WSpλ. We precise that by fresh we mean that a new and
independent random value is sampled each time, even in case of multiple token
extractions of the same keyword. The distance to the previous game can be upper
bounded to the DI security of the obfuscator.
Game5 : Analogously, we say a message m is unpaired if m ∈ mb and m /∈ wb. During
the simulation of LR oracle, if m is an unpaired message not in FirstPhase list, we
encrypt r instead of T [m], where r is a fresh random value uniformly sampled from
WSpλ. We precise that by fresh we mean that a new and independent random value
is sampled each time, even in case of repetitions of the same message. We bound
this hop down to IND-CPA.
Game6 : In this game, irrespective of the bit b, we use the second set of keywords for
challenge token generation.
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We now analyze the transitions between each game and the reduction of Game5 to DI
game.
Game0 to Game1. Any adversary (S,A) with visible advantage difference in these two
games can be converted to an adversary B1 against the security of PRP. Assume that lazy
sampling is implemented using a table T , i.e., T [w] indicates the random value assigned
to w. Algorithm B1 runs adversary (S,A) inside it, simulating all the details of Game0,
bar the computation of the PRP. For this, algorithm B1 uses its Fn oracle. When A
terminates, B1 checks if A succeeded in winning the game. If so, it outputs 0. Otherwise,
it outputs 1.
When the Fn oracle implements the PRP, Game0 is simulated for A, and when Fn
implements a random permutation, Game1 is simulated. Therefore,
Pr[Game0(1
λ)]− Pr[Game1(1λ)] = AdvprpPRP,B1(λ) .
Game1 to Game2. Both games are exactly the same unless the bad event that causes
abortion is triggered. Game2 aborts if there are values w1 and w2 in list such that
w1 = T [w2]. We show that an adversary (S,A) that triggers the bad event in Game2
can be converted to an adversary B2 against the one-wayness property of Obf. For an
intuition on this game hop, observe that all occurrences of T [w] are obfuscated and T [w]
is uniformly distributed.
During the simulation of Game2, table T expands up to (t+ s+ q) entries. Algorithm
B2 receives in its challenge (t + q) obfuscated copies of a random point circuit. At the
beginning of its execution, B2 randomly guesses the first occurrence of w2 in the game,
by sampling i is uniformly from {1, ..., (t+ s+ q)}. (Keyword w2 is of course unknown to
B2 at this point, the guess reflects a prediction of when such keyword involved in the bad
event will be added to table T .) Then, B2 simulates for adversary (S,A) all the details
of Game2 until a new keyword comes that will cause table T to expand to i entries.
Instead of sampling T [w2], B2 embeds one of its challenge circuits in the computation
of Obf(1λ,C[T [w2]]). (If w2 is a message, nothing needs to be done.) Thenceforth, B2
embeds a new circuit from its challenge each time it needs to extract a token for w2. In
any case, B2 never needs more than (t+ q) challenge circuits to complete its simulation.
At the end of the game, if B2’s guess is correct, which happens with probability
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1/(t + s + q), there is w1 ∈ list such that w1 = T [w2]. This equality can be checked by
evaluating w1 on one of B2’s obfuscated circuits. If so, B2 outputs w1 and wins the game.
Hence,
Pr[Game1(1
λ)]− Pr[Game2(1λ)] ≤ (t+ s+ q) ·AdvowObf,B2(λ) .
Game2 to Game3. Any legitimate adversary (S,A) with visible advantage difference in
these two games can be converted to an adversary B3 against IND-CPA security of FE.
For an intuition on this reduction, observe that all tokens are extracted from circuits
of the form (Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[T [w]])), which return 1 when evaluated on both
w and T [w]. Illegitimate tokens that would allow to distinguish encryptions of m from
encryption of T [m] have been excluded in Game2, given that the game aborts if adversary
(S,A) outputs a value sampled for the simulation of the random permutation.
Algorithm B3 runs adversary (S,A) inside it, simulating all the details common to
Game2 and Game3. B3 receives mpk and runs adversary A with it. For token-generation
and encryption, B3 relies on its oracles. When B3 needs to compute a token for some
keyword w, it queries its own TGen oracle with circuit (Obf(1λ,C[w])∨Obf(1λ,C[T [w]])).
When B3 needs to compute the encryption of some message m in Game2 or T [m] in
Game3, it queries its own LR oracle with (m, T [m]). The ciphertexts output by LR
oracle in game IND-CPA allow B3 to interpolate between the simulation of Game2 and
Game3. The simulation is perfect. Eventually, A outputs b′, which B3 forwards as its
own guess.
Now, let’s analyze legitimacy of B3. Legitimacy condition of IND-CPA requires that
for all C queried to TGen and all (m0,m1) queried to LR, we have that C(m0) = C(m1).
In the execution of B3, queried circuits are of the form (Obf(1λ,C[w])∨Obf(1λ,C[T [w]]))
and queried messages of the form (m, T [m]). More precisely, legitimacy requires that
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∀w ∈ TList,∀m ∈ MList,
(Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[T [w]]))(m) = (Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[T [w]]))(T [m])
⇔ (C[w] ∨ C[T [w]])(m) = (C[w] ∨ C[T [w]])(T [m]) / func. preserving
⇔ C[w](m) ∨ C[T [w]](m) = C[w](T [m]) ∨ C[T [w]](T [m])
⇔ C[w](m) = C[T [w]](T [m]) / bad event in Game2
⇔ (w ?= m) = (T [w] ?= T [m])
⇔True .
Therefore, B3 is a legitimate adversary against IND-CPA and we have that
Pr[Game2(1
λ)]− Pr[Game3(1λ)] = Advind-cpaFE,B3 (λ) .
Game3 to Game4. Any legitimate adversary (S,A) with visible advantage difference in
these two games can be converted to an adversary (S4,B4) against DI security of Obf. The
intuition here is the following: Without a ciphertext that encrypts T [w], the adversary
cannot detect if tokens for w are extracted from (Obf(1λ,C[w])∨Obf(1λ,C[T [w]])) or from
(Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[r])), where r is a fresh random value uniformly sampled from
WSpλ. Details of adversary (S4,B4) are shown in Figure A.1.
Sampler S4 computes two t× (t+ q) matrices M0 and M1. Each row in M0 contains
(t + q) repetitions of a unique random point circuit. M1 contains t × (t + q) fresh ran-
dom point circuits. S4 is clearly unpredictable. Algorithm B4 runs S and A inside it,
simulating all the details common to Game3 and Game4, which only differ on unpaired
keywords not in FirstPhase list. For those, B4 carefully picks circuits from its challenge
matrix of obfuscated circuits: A new row is assigned to a new keyword; a circuit is picked
from a new column in case of repetitions. If M0 is selected in game DI, algorithm B4
will simulate Game3. On the other hand, if M1 is selected in game DI, algorithm B4 will
simulate Game4. Finally, when A outputs its guess, B4 checks if A succeeded in winning
the game. If so, B4 outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1. Therefore, we have that
Pr[Game3(1
λ)]− Pr[Game4(1λ)] = AdvdiObf,S4,B4(λ) .
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S4(1λ, st):
for i ∈ {1, ..., t}
T [i] ←$ WSpλ \ T
for j ∈ {1, ..., (t + q)}
M0[i][j]← C[T [i]]
r ←$ WSpλ
M1[i][j]← C[r]
return (M0,M1, )
B4(1λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
M ←$ DI.Sam()
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
return (b = b′)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
if (w ∈ wb ∧ w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase)
CR ← Select(w)
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
LR(st):
FirstPhase← List
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ wb ∪mb
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, T [mb])
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if (w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase) then
CR ← Select(w)
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
Select(w) :
if (Row[w] =⊥) then
/ assign next available row to w
Row[w]← |Row| + 1
/ initialize counter for w
Column[Row[w]]← 0
// increase counter for w
Column[Row[w]]← Column[Row[w]] + 1
// return fresh obfuscated circuit
return (M[Row[w]][Column[Row[w]]])
Figure A.1: DI adversary (S4,B4), as part of proof of Theorem 8.
Game4 to Game5. Any legitimate adversary (S,A) with visible advantage difference in
these two games can be converted to an adversary B5 against IND-CPA security of FE.
The intuition here is simple: Without a token for m, the adversary cannot detect if we
encrypt a fresh random value r instead if T [m]. Details of adversary B5 are shown in
Figure A.2.
Let d denote the challenge bit in the IND-CPA game for FE. Let d′ denote B5’s output.
By definition, we have that
Advind-cpaFE,B5 (λ) = Pr[d
′ = 0|d = 0]− Pr[d′ = 0|d = 1].
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Also, let Ter be the event that B5 terminates because A queried w ∈ RList. We have that
Pr[d′ = 0|d = 0] = Pr[d′ = 0|d = 0 ∧ ¬Ter] · Pr[¬Ter] + Pr[d′ = 0|d = 0 ∧ Ter] · Pr[Ter]
= Pr[d′ = 0|d = 0 ∧ ¬Ter] · Pr[¬Ter] + 0 / B5 never outputs 0 if Ter
= Pr[d′ = 0|d = 0 ∧ ¬Ter] · (1− s · q|WSpλ|
) / d = 0, so RList is hidden
≥ Pr[d′ = 0|d = 0 ∧ ¬Ter]− s · q|WSpλ|
= Pr[Game4(1
λ)]− s · q|WSpλ|
Pr[d′ = 0|d = 1] = Pr[d′ = 0|d = 1 ∧ ¬Ter] · Pr[¬Ter] + Pr[d′ = 0|d = 1 ∧ Ter] · Pr[Ter]
= Pr[d′ = 0|d = 1 ∧ ¬Ter] · Pr[¬Ter] + 0 / B5 never outputs 0 if Ter
≤ Pr[d′ = 0|d = 1 ∧ ¬Ter] = Pr[Game5(1λ)].
We now analyze legitimacy of B5. Legitimacy condition of IND-CPA requires that for
all C queried to TGen and all (m0,m1) queried to LR, we have that C(m0) = C(m1).
In the execution of B5, queried circuits are of the form (Obf(1λ,C[w])∨Obf(1λ,C[T [w]]))
and queried messages of the form (T [m], r). More precisely, legitimacy requires that
∀w ∈ TList,∀m ∈mb s.t. m /∈ wb ∧m /∈ FirstPhase,∀r ∈ RList, we have that
(Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[T [w]]))(T [m]) = (Obf(1λ,C[w]) ∨ Obf(1λ,C[T [w]]))(r)
⇔ (C[w] ∨ C[T [w]])(T [m]) = (C[w] ∨ C[T [w]])(r) / func. preserving
⇔ C[w](T [m]) ∨ C[T [w]](T [m]) = C[w](r) ∨ C[T [w]](r)
⇔ C[T [w]](T [m]) = C[w](r) ∨ C[T [w]](r) / bad event in Game2
⇔ C[T [w]](T [m]) = C[T [w]](r) / B5 outputs 1, Ter event
⇔ C[w](m) = C[T [w]](r)
⇔ 0 = C[T [w]](r) / Res-PRIV restriction
⇔ 0 = 0 / with high probability C[T [w]](r) = 0 .
Therefore,
Pr[Game4(1
λ)]− Pr[Game5(1λ)] ≤ Advind-cpaFE,B5 (λ) +
s · q
|WSpλ|
.
110
B5(1λ,mpk):
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
if (∃ w1,w2 ∈ List s.t. w1 = T [w2]) abort
return (¬(b = b′))
LR(st):
FirstPhase← List
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ wb ∪mb
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
for all m ∈ mb
if (m /∈ wb ∧ m /∈ FirstPhase) then
r ←$ WSpλ
RList← RList : r
c ←$ IND-CPA.LR(T [m], r)
else
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, T [m])
c← c : c
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if (w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase) then
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : IND-CPA.TGen((CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
if w ∈ RList exit 1 // B5 terminates and outputs 1
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
if (w ∈ wb ∧ w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase)
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ IND-CPA.TGen((CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Figure A.2: IND-CPA adversary B5, as part of proof of Theorem 8.
Game5 to Game6. In this game, irrespective of the bit, we use the second set of keywords
for challenge token generation. We construct an adversary (S6,B6) against DI as follows.
B6 generates by itself a master secret key and master public key pair (msk,mpk), then
runs A(mpk). First-phase TGen queries are answered using a lazily sampled T and a
generated msk. We set the DI sampler S6 to run the PRIV sampler S and on top of the
output keywords, also ask for obfuscations of messages that match a first-phase query.
By legitimacy of A, these messages must be LR-identical. Using the symmetry of roles for
keywords and messages in point functions, this sampler can be shown to be unpredictable
whenever the PRIV sampler is. We find paired messages using the image matrix. The
obfuscations of messages will allow us to check if any of these messages (hidden under the
obfuscation) match a first-phase TGen query. For messages that were queried during
the first stage, we select the correct T -value. For messages that are at the same time new
and paired, we sample a new T -value the first time and answer consistently throughout
the game. For all unpaired messages that were never queried to TGen, we use forgetful
values (rules of Game5). Second phase TGen queries are answered using T -consistent
values relying on the fact that we can use the obfuscations to check matches with paired
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keywords and the restriction that adversary cannot query a new unpaired message to
TGen. Finally, we output whatever the PRIV adversary A outputs. More details on
how to construct S6,B6 are available in Figure A.3.
Pr[Game5(1
λ)]− Pr[Game6(1λ)] ≤ Pr[Game5(1λ)]− 1
2
=
1
2
·AdvdiObf,S6,B6(λ) .
It remains to show that S6 is unpredictable if S is. For this, we build a predictor Q
against sampler S, from a predictor P against sampler S6 (bottom of Figure A.3). Since
S6 outputs the same vector of circuits as S plus circuits that are LR-identical, a distin-
guishing message for the output of S6 is also a distinguishing message for the output of
S. Therefore, we have that
AdvpredS,Q (λ) = Adv
pred
S6,P(λ) .
To conclude our proof, we put everything together:
Advres-privDOX,S,A(λ) := 2 · Pr[Game0(1λ)]− 1
≤ 2 ·AdvprpPRP,B1(λ) + 2 · (t+ s+ q) ·AdvowObf,B2(λ) +
2 ·Advind-cpaFE,B3 (λ) + 2 ·AdvdiObf,S4,B4(λ) + 2 · (Advind-cpaFE,B5 (λ) +
s · q
|WSpλ|
) + AdvdiObf,S6,B6(λ) .
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S6(1λ, st):
(st′, FirstPhase)← st
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z
′) ←$ S(1λ, st)
for i ∈ {1, ..., s}
if (m0[i] ∈ FirstPhase)
// by legitimacy of A, m0[i] ∈ FirstPhase⇒ m0[i] = m1[i]
// the following line ensures unpredictability of S6
if (m0[i] 6= m1[i]) return ([], [],⊥)
m? ← m? : m0[i]
else
m? ← m? : ⊥ // C[⊥](.) := 0 is the zero circuit
z ← (z′,C[w0](m0))
return (w0 : m
?,w1 : m
?, z)
B6(1λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
return b′
LR(st):
FirstPhase← List
(C, z) ←$ DI.Sam((st, FirstPhase))
(z′, ImgMatrix)← z
for i ∈ {1, ..., s}
flag ← 0
if (ImgMatrix[i][] 6= [0, ..., 0])
flag ← 1 / mb[i] ∈ wb
for w ∈ FirstPhase
if (C[(t + i)](w) = 1)
flag ← 2 / mb[i] ∈ FirstPhase
m? ← w / mb[i] = w
if (flag = 0) / encrypt random message
r ←$ WSpλ
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, r)
if (flag = 1) / encrypt T -consistent
(...)
if (flag = 2) / encrypt T [m?]
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, T [m?])
c← c : c
(...)
return (tk, c, z′)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
flagRandom← 0
for i ∈ {1, ..., t}
if (C[i](w) = 1)
/ w ∈ wb
if (ImgMatrix[][i] = [0, ..., 0])
/ w /∈ mb
if w /∈ FirstPhase
flagRandom← 1
if (flagRandom = 1)
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Q1(1λ):
(st, st′) ←$ P1(1λ)
(st′′, FirstPhase)← st
return (st′′, (st′, FirstPhase))
QFunc2 (1λ,C[w0](m0), z′, (st′, FirstPhase)):
m ←$ PFunc′2 (1λ, , (z′,C[w0](m0)), st′)
return m
Func′(m,−):
(C[w0](m),−)← Func(m,−)
if (m ∈ FirstPhase)
(−, C[m](m0))← Func(−,m) / if this query is not legit, AdvpredS6,P (λ) = 0
return (C[w0](m) : C[m](m0))
else
return (C[w0](m) : [0, ..., 0])
Figure A.3: DI adversary (S6,B6) and predictor Q, as part of proof of Theorem 8.
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Game0(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
k ←$ KSp(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk,mb)
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[E(k,w)])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[E(k,w)])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Game1(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
k ←$ KSp(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ wb
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk,mb)
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Game2(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
if (∃ w1,w2 ∈ List s.t. w1 = T [w2]) abort
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ wb ∪mb
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk,mb)
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Game3(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
if (∃ w1,w2 ∈ List s.t. w1 = T [w2]) abort
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ wb ∪mb
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, T [mb])
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Figure A.4: Sequence of games in proof of Theorem 8 (part 1 of 2).
Game4(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
if (∃ w1,w2 ∈ List s.t. w1 = T [w2]) abort
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
FirstPhase← List
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ wb ∪mb
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, T [mb])
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if (w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase) then
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
if (w ∈ wb ∧ w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase)
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Game5(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
if (∃ w1,w2 ∈ List s.t. w1 = T [w2]) abort
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
FirstPhase← List
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ wb ∪mb
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
for all m ∈ mb
if (m /∈ wb ∧ m /∈ FirstPhase) then
r ←$ WSpλ
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, r)
else
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, T [m])
c← c : c
for all w ∈ wb
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if (w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase) then
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
if (w ∈ wb ∧ w /∈ mb ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase)
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Game6(1
λ):
(msk,mpk) ←$ FE.Gen(1λ)
b ←$ {0, 1}
b′ ←$ ALR,TGen(mpk)
if (∃ w1,w2 ∈ List s.t. w1 = T [w2]) abort
return (b = b′)
LR(st):
FirstPhase← List
(w0,w1,m0,m1, z) ←$ S(st)
for all w ∈ w1 ∪m1
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
for all m ∈ m1
if (m /∈ w1 ∧ m /∈ FirstPhase) then
r ←$ WSpλ
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, r)
else
c ←$ FE.Enc(mpk, T [m])
c← c : c
for all w ∈ w1
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if (w /∈ m1 ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase) then
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk← tk : FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return (tk, c, z)
TGen(w):
CL ←$ Obf(1λ, C[w])
if T [w] = ⊥ then
T [w] ←$ WSpλ \ T
List← List : w
if (w ∈ w1 ∧ w /∈ m1 ∧ w /∈ FirstPhase)
r ←$ WSpλ
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[r])
else
CR ←$ Obf(1λ, C[T [w]])
tk ←$ FE.TGen(msk, (CL ∨ CR))
return tk
Figure A.5: Sequence of games in proof of Theorem 8 (part 2 of 2).
